Here is the third of my occasional philosophical notes. The first two (No. 1 and No. 2) offered counterexamples to Karl Popper’s falsificationism. This one takes up another problem for empiricism: the status of logic, geometry, and mathematics.
3. Logic, Geometry, and Mathematics: Not Mere Conventions
A central difficulty confronting empiricism concerns the treatment of logic, geometry and mathematics. These are obviously not empirical sciences concerning real things. There is no logic, no geometry and no arithmetic or number out there in the external world for us to see or be observed. Hence, for empiricists, then, they can merely be some empirically empty formalisms or some linguistic conventions.1 However, formalisms are called formalisms and conventions are called conventions, because they are arbitrary and can be arbitrarily changed. And yet, are logic, geometry, math, etc. really just conventional?
(Interestingly, this “conventionalist” view of the “formal” sciences has promoted the development of various “alternative” logics, geometries and mathematics, grounded in and derived from various arbitrary “axioms.”)2
After all: It appears that some such formalisms or conventions are not arbitrary or arbitrarily changeable but, to the contrary, necessary formulae or conventions.3 Obviously, logic, math, geometry, etc. assist us in getting around in the real world of real objects and hence, there must be something realistic — something “synthetic” — about them.4 Indeed, logic, geometry, math, etc., are themselves “unnatural,” “artificial” and “immaterial” products developed by real people with a purpose in mind: the purpose of better and more successfully dealing with and acting within the world of real, natural things and natural persons around them. They have a practical purpose and a pragmatic foundation.5
For us — for any natural person — it is not just a convention, but an apodictic, a priori true proposition to say, for instance: I, with my natural body, occupy a place in a three-dimensional world made up of other natural persons, from whom I have learned how to speak a common language and with whom I can possibly communicate, i.e., know “how to do things with words,”6 and other, non-human objects, bodies or hollows of various forms, sizes and locations, with which no linguistic or symbolic communication is possible.7
No other world is conceivable. Indeed, any attempt to deny this proposition would run into a performative contradiction: because such a statement would itself be made by a natural person employing his own body, it would be addressed to another natural person, and it would require other, non-human bodies such as (at a minimum) the surfaces on which the speaker and the addressee were to stand.8
Related
- Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Philosophical Notes, No. 1: The Alibi Principle or Popper’s Falsificationism Falsified” (Nov. 3, 2026) — the first note in this series, on Popper’s falsificationism
- Hoppe, “Philosophical Notes, No. 2: The Three-Plate Method or Popper Falsified Again” (Nov. 14, 2026) — the second note, on how constructed measuring norms make geometric propositions true a priori
- Hoppe, “On Man, Nature, Truth, and Justice” (Mises Memorial Lecture, 2015), in The Great Fiction (2d expanded ed., 2021), ch. 8 — the a priori truths about man (bodies, a common language, communication) that cannot be denied without performative contradiction
- Hoppe, “On Praxeology and the Praxeological Foundation of Epistemology,” in Economic Science and the Austrian Method (1995) — Hoppe’s fullest case that logic, arithmetic, and Euclidean geometry are grounded in action rather than in convention
- Hoppe, “Austrian Rationalism in the Age of the Decline of Positivism,” in The Economics and Ethics of Private Property (2d ed., 2006), ch. 14 — on positivism’s treatment of logic and mathematics as “empirically empty formalisms”
- Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism (1989; Mises Institute, 2010), ch. 7, “The Ethical Justification of Capitalism and Why Socialism Is Morally Indefensible” — the original statement of the “a priori of communication and argumentation”
- Hoppe, “On the Proper Study of Man: Reflections on Method,” Quarterly Journal of Austrian Economics 26, no. 4 (2023) — Hoppe’s recent statement on method in the study of man
- Hoppe, “My Discovery of Human Action and of Mises as a Philosopher” (July 27, 2026) — on the rationalist and constructivist philosophers (Dingler, Lorenzen, Janich) behind these notes
- Stephan Kinsella, “Hoppe on Falsificationism, Empiricism, and Apriorism and Protophysics” (StephanKinsella.com, June 9, 2011) — collects Hoppe’s remarks on the a priori status of geometry and protophysics, plus Janich’s English-language works
- Kinsella, “Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide” (Mises Daily, May 23, 2011) — a short introduction to the performative-contradiction argument as it applies to ethics
- Kinsella, “Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics and Its Critics” (StephanKinsella.com, Aug. 11, 2015) — a guide to the critical literature on argumentation ethics
- For the classic positivist statement, see A.J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (London: Victor Gollancz, 1936), ch. 4, “The A Priori,” holding that the propositions of logic and mathematics “give us no information about any empirical situation” and that they “are true universally simply because we never allow them to be anything else.” For a critique, see Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Austrian Rationalism in the Age of the Decline of Positivism,” in The Economics and Ethics of Private Property: Studies in Political Economy and Philosophy, 2d ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2006), ch. 14, pp. 358–59 and n.18, noting that positivists interpret logic and protophysics “as containing no ‘real’ knowledge at all, as empirically empty formalisms,” a view that “has helped legitimize and further the degeneration of parts of logic and mathematics into meaningless symbolic games.” [↩]
- Thus Henri Poincaré concluded that “the principles of geometry are only conventions.” Henri Poincaré, “Author’s Preface,” Science and Hypothesis (London: Walter Scott, 1905). And Rudolf Carnap’s “Principle of Tolerance” holds that “[i]n logic, there are no morals” and that “[i]t is not our business to set up prohibitions, but to arrive at conventions.” Rudolf Carnap, The Logical Syntax of Language (London: Kegan Paul, 1937), § 17; see Hannes Leitgeb and André Carus, “Tolerance, Metaphysics, and Meta-Ontology,” supplement to “Rudolf Carnap,” Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. On three- or more-valued logics as “either meaningless symbolic formalisms or as logically presupposing an understanding of the traditional two-valued logic,” and on non-Euclidean geometries, whose empirical confirmation itself presupposes Euclidean geometry (“the lenses of the telescopes which one uses to confirm Einstein’s theory regarding the non-Euclidean structure of physical space must themselves be constructed according to Euclidean principles”), see Hoppe, “On Praxeology and the Praxeological Foundation of Epistemology,” in Economic Science and the Austrian Method (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 1995), p. 72 n.58, and p. 76 n.62. [↩]
- As Paul Lorenzen puts it: “I call a usage a convention if I know of another usage which I could accept instead. … However, I do not know of another behavior which could replace the use of elementary sentences. … Each proper name is a convention … but to use proper names at all is not a convention: it is a unique pattern of linguistic behavior. Therefore, I am going to call it ‘logical’.” Paul Lorenzen, Normative Logic and Ethics (Mannheim: Bibliographisches Institut, 1969), p. 16, quoted in Hoppe, Economic Science and the Austrian Method, p. 72 n.58. [↩]
- On Kant’s claim that “mathematics and geometry provide examples of true a priori synthetic propositions,” see Hoppe, Economic Science and the Austrian Method, p. 18. Cf. Ludwig von Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science: An Essay on Method (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand, 1962), ch. 1, § 2, “A Hypothesis about the Origin of A Priori Categories”: the a priori categories “are not merely arbitrary assumptions without any informative value”; “[t]hey are the necessary mental tool to arrange sense data in a systematic way,” and they “provide some information about the reality of the universe.” [↩]
- On this “culturalist” view of science as growing out of purposeful everyday practice, see “Methodical culturalism,” Wikipedia; Peter Janich, Kultur und Methode: Philosophie in einer wissenschaftlich geprägten Welt (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2006); and Hoppe, “On Man, Nature, Truth, and Justice,” in The Great Fiction: Property, Economy, Society, and the Politics of Decline, 2d expanded ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2021), ch. 8, p. 134, offering “a cultural(istic) account of man.” On the grounding of logic, arithmetic, and geometry in action, see Hoppe, Economic Science and the Austrian Method, pp. 71–76: the laws of logic “are as much laws of thinking as of reality; because they are laws that have their ultimate foundation in action and could not be undone by any actor”; arithmetic “is rooted in our understanding of repetition, the repetition of action”; and, as to geometry, “Action is the employment of a physical body in space.” [↩]
- J.L. Austin, How to Do Things with Words (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), based on Austin’s William James Lectures at Harvard in 1955. On the “propositional” and the “illocutionary or performative” parts of every speech act, see Hoppe, “On Man, Nature, Truth, and Justice,” pp. 136–37. [↩]
- On why, and in what sense, space is three-dimensional, see Peter Janich, Euclid’s Heritage: Is Space Three-Dimensional? (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992), pt. 2, “Space Is Three-Dimensional: What Does It Mean, and Why Is It True?” [↩]
- On the “a priori of communication and argumentation,” see Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2010), ch. 7, pp. 154–55 and n.116, citing Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas; and idem, “On Man, Nature, Truth, and Justice,” pp. 143–46, concluding “that we do know—and that we cannot without performative contradiction deny knowing—quite a few apriori truths about man,” among them “that we can argue with each other in a common and public language,” and observing that, without our prior possessions, “[w]e would have no feet or ground on which to stand on and make our arguments.” See also Stephan Kinsella, “Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide,” Mises Daily (May 23, 2011); idem, “Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics and Its Critics,” StephanKinsella.com (Aug. 11, 2015). [↩]




















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