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Lehto on the 44-Acre Shakedown; or, In What Sense Do You “Own” Land you You Can’t Build On?

Attorney Steve Lehto has a new video on a property-rights nightmare in Washington state, based on Chris Bennett’s report for AgWeb/Farm Journal.

In 2021, Tyler and Wendy Chambers bought 66 acres at the end of Number 1 Canyon Road outside Wenatchee, in Chelan County. The land was three tax parcels, zoned residential. They wanted to build a home and a pole barn and plant a few acres of orchard. They did their homework: a 30-day feasibility period, meetings with county planners, a surveyor, an engineer, a geologic hazard assessment, and soil and perc tests. The county gave them the green light. Then, as they began moving dirt, a neighbor showed up and told Chambers, “Good luck getting a permit.” The neighbor turned out to be a county commissioner and a former land-trust director.

Complaints followed. The county prosecutor’s office found the first one “unfounded.” But the development director who had approved the project resigned, and in 2022 the county issued a stop-work order and sued. Then came the studies: stormwater, geotechnical, spotted owl, golden eagle, deer, shrub-steppe, even a study to prove no fish lived in a drainage ditch. They cost $5,000 to $20,000 apiece, nearly $300,000 in all, while the couple pays about $3,000 a month on a loan for land they can’t touch. Finally, as “mitigation” under the State Environmental Policy Act (SEPA), the county demanded that they permanently set aside 44.2 acres, two-thirds of their land, under a deed restriction. That was the price of building their home on the rest. Meanwhile, about ten miles away, Microsoft has moved some 500,000 cubic yards of dirt for a data center. That is roughly 500 times the 1,000 cubic yards Chambers is accused of moving, a figure the county never even measured.

The neighbors and a local land trust tell a different story. They accuse Chambers of grading without the required critical-areas review, causing erosion, and trespassing, all of which he denies. The dispute has produced lawsuits on several sides and appeals to the county hearing examiner (see the sources below). But even on the county’s version, look at the remedy: you may build your home, but only if you give the state a permanent veto over two-thirds of your land.1 That is the same kind of land-for-a-permit “exaction” at issue in Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 570 U.S. 595 (2013). There, a Florida water district told a landowner he could build on 3.7 acres only if he gave up the rest of his land to conservation. Libertarian law professor and takings scholar Richard Epstein would say that a restriction like this is a partial taking: his Takings argues that regulations, like outright seizures, presumptively require compensation. But his framework also blesses state takings so long as they supposedly enlarge the social pie and the losers receive “just compensation,” explicit or implicit. I’ve long criticized that utilitarian standard, as it would apply to his justification for intellectual property.2

As Lehto notes, some will say the Chamberses would still “own” the 44 acres. But what good is land you can never build on? Try selling it. I posted this comment on the video:

Many years ago, I met this doctor who told me he lived for a year in China back in the early 1990s. He said, “In fact, I bought house there.” I said, really? What happened to it? “Oh, I still own it.” I said… what? You still own a house in China? Do you ever go there or rent it? Is it just sitting there empty? “No, the government let some family move into it.” I said, well then in what sense do you own it? He said, I don’t know, maybe if I ever visit the family would let me stay in it a couple nights.

The doctor had “title” (or said he did; he was probably wrong about this too). What he didn’t have was the right to use (or exclude). As I’ve put it, “a property right is not a right to control a resource but a right to exclude others.”3 And normally the right to exclude gives the owner the right to use (but not the right to use the owned resource as a means to invade others’ property, that is, to commit aggression).4 In short, whoever decides who may use a thing (or not use it) is its real owner.5 In the doctor’s case, that was the Chinese state, or the family it installed.

Likewise, once the county holds a permanent deed restriction over the Chambers acreage, the county, not the Chamberses, decides whether anything is ever built there. They would keep the title (and no doubt the tax bill); the state would get the control. Mises called this the “German pattern” of socialism, which “nominally and seemingly preserves private ownership of the means of production.” Under it, the former entrepreneurs become mere “shop managers” who “are bound to obey unconditionally the orders issued by the government’s supreme office of production management.”6 (This is why IP rights are a form of fascism.)7 Nor would paying the Chamberses for the 44 acres cure the problem, whatever Epstein’s framework says. Compensation set by the taker does not turn a taking into a trade, and since value is subjective, there is no way to know it is “just.”8

References

The Chambers Case: Reports and Commentary

The Chambers Case: County Proceedings

Cases and Statutes

  • Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District, 570 U.S. 595 (2013); see also Paul J. Beard II, “A Summary of the Koontz Decision,” Pacific Legal Foundation (June 25, 2013). Holds that permit conditions demanding land or money must meet the Nollan/Dolan nexus and proportionality tests, even when the permit is denied.
  • Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, 594 U.S. 139 (2021). Holds that a regulation giving union organizers access to farms was a per se taking because it took the owners’ right to exclude, “one of the most essential sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.”
  • La. Civ. Code art. 707. Gives the prohibition of building on an estate as its example of a nonapparent servitude.

Kinsella on Property, Ownership, and the Right to Exclude

Kinsella on IP, Negative Servitudes, and Socialism

  • Stephan Kinsella, “IP and Aggression as Limits on Property Rights: How They Differ,” StephanKinsella.com (Jan. 22, 2010). The ban on aggression limits only invasions of others’ property; IP gives a non-owner a veto over an owner’s use of his own things.
  • Idem, “Intellectual Property Rights as Negative Servitudes,” C4SIF.org (June 23, 2011), also published at Mises Wire (June 23, 2011). Argues that patents and copyrights are nonconsensual negative servitudes granted by state fiat, giving IP holders a veto over how others use their own property. The county’s no-build deed restriction is another such servitude.
  • Idem, “Twitter Rant about IP and Socialism,” C4SIF.org (May 27, 2025). Every legal system has some property rights scheme; systems that depart from libertarian assignment rules, IP among them, are socialist.

Kinsella on Epstein, Takings, and Remedies

Other Works on Takings and Remedies

  • Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985). Epstein’s classic argument that regulations, like outright seizures, are takings that presumptively require compensation.
  • Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, “Epstein’s Takings Doctrine and the Public-Goods Problem,” Texas Law Review 65 (1987): 1233. A libertarian critique of Epstein’s reliance on public-goods theory to justify the takings power.
  • Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 16 n.42, pp. 53, 99. The future President of the International Court of Justice on why a right without a remedy is hollow.

Other Works on Property, Ownership, and Socialism

  • Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), excerpted as “Is There Room for Compromise with Socialism?,” Mises Daily (Dec. 27, 2018). The “German pattern” of socialism, which keeps private ownership in name while the state controls its use.
  • Hans-Hermann Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989; Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2010), ch. 5, “The Socialism of Conservatism.” Hoppe treats regulation as a form of socialism: partial expropriation that leaves owners with title but not control.
  • Thomas W. Merrill, “Property and the Right to Exclude,” Nebraska Law Review 77 (1998): 730. The classic law-review argument that the right to exclude is the sine qua non of property.
  • Cf. Ilya Somin, “The Right to Use Private Property,” The Volokh Conspiracy (Mar. 31, 2026). A different emphasis: argues that the right to use property deserves stronger Takings Clause protection.
  1. A deed restriction barring construction is a textbook negative servitude: it obliges the owner of the burdened land to refrain from doing something on his own property. Louisiana’s Civil Code even gives “the prohibition of building on an estate” as its example of a nonapparent servitude. See La. Civ. Code art. 707. Ordinarily a servitude binds an owner only if he grants it. But “consent” extracted as the price of a building permit is not real consent. This is thus another nonconsensual negative servitude imposed by the state, like the ones patents and copyrights impose on everyone else’s property by giving IP holders a veto over how others use their own things. See Stephan Kinsella, “Intellectual Property Rights as Negative Servitudes,” C4SIF.org (June 23, 2011). There I also note that zoning and similar regulations are “forms of negative servitudes, if not outright transfers of property rights.” [↩]
  2. See Richard A. Epstein, Takings: Private Property and the Power of Eminent Domain (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1985); Kinsella, “Richard Epstein’s Takings Political Theory versus Epstein’s Intellectual Property Views,” C4SIF.org (Nov. 4, 2011); idem, “Richard Epstein’s Takings Theory of the State,” StephanKinsella.com (July 6, 2025). [↩]
  3. Kinsella, Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston: Papinian Press, 2023), p. 32; see also idem, “Libertarian Answer Man: Easements and Rights of Way,” StephanKinsella.com (Mar. 7, 2024). Just as a right to “own” something you have no right to exclude others from is meaningless, a right without a remedy is not a real right. As I have previously pointed out, “it is a common legal observation that a right without a remedy is hollow—i.e., not a real right at all.” Idem, “Libertarianism, Minarchists, International Law, and Eminent Domain,” StephanKinsella.com (July 27, 2026), text at n.22, cross-posted from the PFS Blog. Rosalyn Higgins, later President of the International Court of Justice, makes the same point; as I put it in my review of her book, “as Higgins observes, a right without a remedy is hollow indeed.” Kinsella, “Book Review of Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It,” Reason Papers No. 20 (Fall 1995): 147–153, citing Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 16 n.42, pp. 53, 99. [↩]
  4. But as I have pointed out, this is not a limitation on property rights, but a limit on action. See Kinsella, “The Non-Aggression Principle as a Limit on Action, Not on Property Rights; Individuals are Responsible for Actions, not ‘for Their Property’; Property rights are not obligations or responsibilities,” StephanKinsella.com (Jan. 22, 2010) (“property rights are not limits on or limited by other property rights; property rights are limits on action”); idem, “IP and Aggression as Limits on Property Rights: How They Differ,” StephanKinsella.com (Jan. 22, 2010); idem, “Libertarian Answer Man: Easements and Rights of Way,” StephanKinsella.com (Mar. 7, 2024) (“property rights do not limit other property rights, they limit actions”). [↩]
  5. This is why I argue that what distinguishes libertarianism is not that we believe in property rights; all systems have some system of property rights. What distinguishes libertarianism is our particular property allocation rules. See Kinsella, LFFS, ch. 2, pp. 13–14 & n.5 (“Every legal system defines and enforces some property rights system. … What is distinctive about libertarianism is its particular property assignment rules”); idem, “What Libertarianism Is,” in Jörg Guido Hülsmann & Stephan Kinsella, eds., Property, Freedom, and Society: Essays in Honor of Hans-Hermann Hoppe (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2009); idem, “How To Think About Property (2019),” StephanKinsella.com (Apr. 25, 2021) (“every political system believes in property rights, that is, the right to control resources as assigned by their legal system to some owners”); idem, “Twitter Rant about IP and Socialism,” C4SIF.org (May 27, 2025) (“Socialist systems are those that assign property rights in other ways”). [↩]
  6. Ludwig von Mises, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1949), excerpted as “Is There Room for Compromise with Socialism?,” Mises Daily (Dec. 27, 2018). [↩]
  7. Patents and copyrights give the IP holder a veto over how others use their own property. The owner of a printer or a factory keeps nominal title, but the state and the IP holder dictate what he may do with it: Mises’s German pattern in miniature. See Kinsella, “Intellectual Property Rights as Negative Servitudes,” C4SIF.org (June 23, 2011); idem, “IP and Aggression as Limits on Property Rights: How They Differ,” StephanKinsella.com (Jan. 22, 2010) (the IP advocate “wants A to have a veto over B’s use of B’s own disk”); idem, “Twitter Rant about IP and Socialism,” C4SIF.org (May 27, 2025). [↩]
  8. See Kinsella, “Libertarianism, Minarchists, International Law, and Eminent Domain,” StephanKinsella.com (July 27, 2026); idem, “Email to Richard Epstein: Tension Between Takings Framework and IP Views,” C4SIF.org (Mar. 28, 2026); see also Jeffrey Rogers Hummel, “Epstein’s Takings Doctrine and the Public-Goods Problem,” Texas Law Review 65 (1987): 1233. [↩]

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