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Hoppe’s Favorites Sources and Thinkers

Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s writing is rigorous and also remarkably learned. He draws on a wealth of sources and thinkers—philosophers, economists, sociologists, historians, anthropologists—across many fields, and he returns to some of them again and again. For a taste, see his “Anarcho-Capitalism: An Annotated Bibliography.” Besides Rothbard and the Austro-libertarians, it covers alternative approaches, precursors, and “congenial writings” by the likes of Robert Nisbet, Bertrand de Jouvenel, and Franz Oppenheimer.1

Over the years I’ve learned a great deal from many of these thinkers myself. I’ve cited some of them in my own work, and many of their books are in my library. So I recently gave Claude, Anthropic’s AI, seven of Hoppe’s books: A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism (TSC), Economic Science and the Austrian Method (ESAM), The Economics and Ethics of Private Property (EEPP), Democracy: The God That Failed (DGF), The Great Fiction: Property, Economy, Society, and the Politics of Decline (TGF), A Short History of Man: Progress and Decline, and Economy, Society, and History (ESH). I asked it to identify the main thinkers Hoppe relies on and cites positively and repeatedly, and to summarize what he typically cites each one for. I started with the realist and rationalist philosophers behind, for example, the epistemology and ethics of chapters 6 and 7 of TSC. Then I asked about Alasdair MacIntyre, and then about Robert Nisbet and other sociologists like him. Here is what it came up with.2 (Sadly, because of copyright fascism, most of these works are not legally available online.)3

1. The Philosophers

These are the philosophers Hoppe cites most often and most approvingly, roughly in order of how much he leans on them. Strictly speaking, most of them are rationalists or anti-empiricists rather than realists. Blanshard leaned idealist, and the Erlangen constructivists, Apel and Habermas, and Kant aren’t realists either. The real realists in the group are Henry Veatch, John Wild, and Andrew van Melsen.

  1. Brand Blanshard, Reason and Analysis and The Nature of Thought. He is the most widely cited of the lot, appearing in six of the seven books. Hoppe lists him among the “particularly valuable general defenses of rationalism” against empiricism and relativism. He uses Blanshard for several points: the law of contradiction can’t be denied without presupposing it (TSC ch. 6 n. 108, quoting p. 276); real versus stipulated definitions; rationalist accounts of logic and arithmetic; and the case against many-valued logics such as Waismann’s. In ESH ch. 1, he draws on Blanshard for what separates human reason from animal consciousness: self-conscious reflection and “the power to be guided by principle.”
  2. Henry Veatch, Rational Man: A Modern Interpretation of Aristotelian Ethics, For an Ontology of Morals, Human Rights: Fact or Fancy?, and “Deconstruction in Philosophy: Has Rorty Made It the Denouement of Contemporary Analytical Philosophy?” Hoppe calls him “an eminent contemporary natural rights philosopher” and endorses his refutation of both “desire” (utilitarian) and “duty” (deontological) ethics. He also uses Veatch against relativism and pluralism (Rational Man, pp. 37–46, including Veatch’s quotation of Mussolini drawing relativism’s logical conclusion), and against hermeneutics, Rorty, and the “new nihilism.” Veatch coined the phrase “intellectual permissiveness.” But Hoppe has caveats (TSC ch. 7 n. 118; EEPP, “From the Economics of Laissez Faire to the Ethics of Libertarianism”). The natural-rights appeal to “human nature” is too vague a starting point. Moral philosophers like Veatch lack a precise definition of property and wind up in “a sea of vagueness.” And his own approach “owes nothing” to the natural-rights tradition as it stands, though it might fit a “rightly conceived” one.
  3. Arthur Pap, Semantics and Necessary Truth and Analytische Erkenntnistheorie. Hoppe cites Pap for the defense of synthetic a priori, necessary truths against conventionalism (TSC ch. 6 n. 93; DGF, Introduction n. 11; TGF, “In Defense of Extreme Rationalism”). He also cites Pap’s point that basic statements undercut Popper’s claimed asymmetry between verification and falsification.
  4. Martin Hollis and Edward Nell, Rational Economic Man: A Philosophical Critique of Neo-Classical Economics. Hoppe calls it a “splendid philosophical critique of empiricist economics.” He uses them to show that positivism’s analytic/synthetic dichotomy refutes itself (quoted at TSC ch. 6 n. 96), and on real versus “lexical” or “stipulative” definitions (pp. 177–78). In TGF he enlists them against McCloskey as “arch-rationalist” allies from the other end of the political spectrum. His one disagreement is that they make “reproduction of the economic system,” rather than action, the basic concept of economics.
  5. Paul Lorenzen (and Wilhelm Kamlah), Methodisches Denken, Normative Logic and Ethics, Einführung in die operative Logik und Mathematik, and Kamlah and Lorenzen’s Logische Propädeutik. This is the Erlangen-school constructivist backbone of Hoppe’s epistemology. It gives him constructivist foundations for logic and arithmetic, and Euclidean geometry as a priori. It also gives him “protophysics”: geometry, chronometry, and hylometry as a priori theories that make empirical measurement possible. From Lorenzen he takes the point that each predicator is a convention, but using predicators at all is not. From Kamlah and Lorenzen he takes the point that terms are tied to reality through practice (TSC ch. 6 n. 94). And Lorenzen supplies cognitivist ethics (TSC ch. 6 n. 104, ch. 7 n. 115).
  6. Friedrich Kambartel, Erfahrung und Struktur: Bausteine zu einer Kritik des Empirismus und Formalismus. He also edited Praktische Philosophie und konstruktive Wissenschaftstheorie and, with Jürgen Mittelstrass, Zum normativen Fundament der Wissenschaft. Hoppe calls chapter 3 of Erfahrung und Struktur “a brilliant interpretation and justification of Kant’s aprioristic epistemology.” It is an activist, constructivist reading of Kant that answers the charge of idealism. Hoppe also relies on Kambartel’s critique of empiricism and mathematical formalism, his argument that Euclidean geometry is a precondition of measurement, and his explanation of why Heisenberg doesn’t refute causality.
  7. Peter Janich, Die Protophysik der Zeit (Protophysics of Time). In TSC and ESAM, Hoppe cites Janich on the a priori foundations of time measurement. He also cites him for the point that instruments built to Euclidean norms are presupposed when testing non-Euclidean physics. In TGF (“The Libertarian Quest for a Grand Historical Narrative”), Hoppe calls him “the great late German philosopher-scientist” and adopts his maxim that “Handwerk” comes before “Mundwerk.” Engineering and construction ground science, and that refutes both Kuhn’s relativism and Popper’s falsificationism. Janich is also the source of the counterexamples to Popper in Hoppe’s new “Philosophical Notes” series here on PFS (No. 1, No. 2). Hoppe himself put me onto Janich years ago; see my 2011 post on protophysics in the Related list. Hugo Dingler belongs here too: Hoppe credits Lorenzen and the Erlangen school with building protophysics “following the lead of Hugo Dingler.”
  8. Karl-Otto Apel and Jürgen Habermas. From Apel: Transformation der Philosophie, vol. 2 (especially “Das Apriori der Kommunikationsgemeinschaft und die Grundlagen der Ethik”), and Die Erklären-Verstehen-Kontroverse. From Habermas: “Wahrheitstheorien,” Moralbewusstsein und kommunikatives Handeln, Zur Logik der Sozialwissenschaften, and Knowledge and Human Interests. Habermas was Hoppe’s dissertation supervisor.4 From them Hoppe takes three things. First, the “a priori of communication and argumentation,” the core of argumentation ethics. Second, epistemological dualism, including the argument (for which he cites Apel) that knowledge and action can’t be causally predicted, because we can learn. Third, the view of natural science as an instrument of action. But he parts ways sharply: “With this step I lose, once and for all, the company of philosophers like Habermas and Apel.” Their ignorance of economics keeps them from seeing that argumentation presupposes private property (EEPP, “The Justice of Economic Efficiency”).
  9. Immanuel Kant. Hoppe draws on Kant for the synthetic a priori; for the dictum that “reason can only understand what it has itself produced according to its own design” (TSC ch. 6 n. 99); and for the universalization principle (TSC ch. 7 n. 119). His twist, following Mises (ESAM), is to ground the categories in action. Then Kantian rationalism becomes “a realistic epistemology,” because “it is through actions that the mind and reality make contact.” He also defends Kant against Ayn Rand’s caricature, which he calls her “arrogant ignorance regarding Kant.”
  10. Alan Gewirth, Reason and Morality. This is qualified praise. Hoppe calls it an “important study” and says his own method closely resembles Gewirth’s “dialectically necessary method.” But Gewirth picks the wrong starting point, action rather than argumentation, so he can’t derive universalizable rights (TSC ch. 7 n. 117).

Also worth noting:

  • John Wild, Plato’s Modern Enemies and the Theory of Natural Law: natural-law realism, always cited alongside Veatch.
  • Andrew van Melsen, Philosophy of Nature: a Thomist, cited for the claim that reality consists of particular objects with abstract properties (TSC ch. 6 n. 102).
  • Saul Kripke, “Naming and Necessity”: cited alongside Pap and Blanshard (DGF, Introduction n. 11).
  • Morris Cohen, Reason and Nature and Preface to Logic: rationalist logic.
  • G.H. von Wright, Norm and Action and Explanation and Understanding: action versus causal explanation.
  • John Searle, Minds, Brains and Science: an action’s “preferred description” (TGF, “Two Notes on Preference and Indifference”).
  • Aquinas, the late Spanish Scholastics, Grotius, and Locke: the rationalist natural-law and homesteading tradition.
  • And of course Mises and Rothbard. Examples include Mises’s point in The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science that the law of contradiction is implied in the axiom of action (TSC ch. 6 n. 108), and Rothbard’s passage in The Ethics of Liberty that anyone participating in a discussion is “alive and affirming life” (TSC ch. 7 n. 125).

2. What About MacIntyre?

I also asked about Alasdair MacIntyre. He doesn’t make the cut. He comes up only three times in these books, and not as an ally:

  • Against Gewirth. TSC ch. 7 n. 117 (repeated in EEPP) cites After Virtue, pp. 64–65, as “perceptive remarks” on why Gewirth can’t derive universal rights from action. It cites Habermas and Veatch on the same point.
  • As a foil. In “Rothbardian Ethics” (EEPP, 2d ed.), Hoppe calls him “a prominent philosopher of the relativist persuasion” and turns the title Whose Justice? Which Rationality? against him. That question makes sense only for Crusoe facing a gorilla, which Hoppe calls an “extra-moral” situation. Between beings capable of argumentation, it has an answer.
  • In passing. ESAM cites The Unconscious (1958) on the logic of psychoanalytic explanation.

So Hoppe reads MacIntyre as a relativist, which is interesting given MacIntyre’s Aristotelian-Thomist turn.

3. Nisbet and Other Non-Leftist Sociologists

Hoppe groups several of these himself. In ESH he calls Stanislav Andreski “one of those very few sociologists who is not a leftist. There are a few others like Robert Nisbet and Helmut Schoeck.”5 Nisbet, Jouvenel, and Oppenheimer also appear in his annotated bibliography.

  1. Robert Nisbet, Community and Power6, Conservatism: Dream and Reality and his essay “Conservatism,” Prejudices: A Philosophical Dictionary, The Present Age, and History of the Idea of Progress. Hoppe cites him mostly in DGF, especially “On Conservatism and Libertarianism.” He uses Nisbet for several themes:
    • Real conservatism has two central concepts, property and authority, and liberty and equality are incompatible. Here Hoppe pairs Nisbet with Kuehnelt-Leddihn and Röpke.
    • Family and property are tightly bound together.
    • When government takes over the family’s historic functions, the family weakens. Hoppe turns this against the neoconservatives and the Christian Right.
    • Abolishing the associations between the individual and the state produces atomized masses and centralized power.
    • Old-style American conservatives opposed war, and Reagan’s “passion for crusades, moral and military, is scarcely American-conservative.”
    • Medieval power was “derived from many independent sources,” and feudalism has been smeared by intellectuals serving the modern state.
    • Even the kings of the 17th-century “absolute monarchies” probably wielded less real authority than modern governments do.
  2. Helmut Schoeck, Envy: A Theory of Social Behavior, Ist Leistung unanständig?, and Das Recht auf Ungleichheit. He is cited in five of the seven books, on envy as the driver of egalitarianism and redistribution, and on primitive societies where fear of envy chokes off innovation and saving. Hoppe usually pairs him with Rothbard’s Egalitarianism as a Revolt Against Nature.
  3. Stanislav Andreski. Hoppe calls Social Sciences as Sorcery a “brilliant critique of contemporary sociology.” He also uses The African Predicament and Parasitism and Subversion on the Third World, The Uses of Comparative Sociology on the limits of medieval warfare, and Max Weber’s Insights and Errors on Confucianism.
  4. Franz Oppenheimer, The State and System der Soziologie, vol. 2: Der Staat. Hoppe uses him for the distinction between “economic means” and “political means” (pp. 24–27), for the conquest theory of the state’s origin, and for “the basic norm of the state is power” (pp. 322–23), on the discriminatory character of state law.
  5. Alexander Rüstow, Freedom and Domination: A Historical Critique of Civilization. He backs up Oppenheimer’s conquest theory and is a main source in TGF’s “The Western State as a Paradigm: Learning from History,” on the Renaissance, absolutism, and the rise of the modern state.
  6. Gaetano Mosca and Robert Michels, The Ruling Class and Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens. Cited on the social psychology of democracy and the tendency of democratic rule to “degenerate” into oligarchy.
  7. Edward Banfield (a political scientist), The Unheavenly City Revisited and “Present-Orientedness and Crime.” He is central to DGF’s time-preference argument. Time preference is what separates the classes. “Lower-class” pathologies stem from high time preference, not poverty; if anything, causation runs the other way. And the threat of punishment is unlikely to deter the present-oriented. Hoppe usually pairs him with Charles Murray’s Losing Ground.
  8. Arnold Gehlen, Man and Anthropologische Forschung. In ESH ch. 1, Hoppe recommends him “quite highly” despite Gehlen’s “connection with the Nazis.” Gehlen describes a logic in the development of technology: tools replace, extend, and relieve our organs, and inorganic materials and forces gradually replace organic ones.
  9. Bertrand de Jouvenel, On Power, Sovereignty, and The Nature of Politics. He is a political philosopher more than a sociologist, but he is the most heavily cited of this group, with about 29 mentions in DGF alone. Hoppe uses him for the ubiquity of natural authority and natural elites. He also uses him for the medieval king as judge rather than legislator: a “debtor for justice” with little real power, who had to solicit “subsidies” instead of taxing. And he uses him for the steady growth of governmental power since the twelfth century.

Others cited approvingly but less often include Charles Murray (Human Accomplishment, Losing Ground), Norbert Elias (Hoppe largely accepts the “civilizing process” thesis Pinker borrowed from Elias, but explains it differently), and the ethnologist Wilhelm Mühlmann.

4. Conclusion

Mises and Rothbard aside, that is a pretty good reading list on its own, and it only scratches the surface. Hoppe also leans on historians, such as Fritz Kern on medieval kingship and law and Carlo Cipolla on preindustrial Europe, not to mention the economists. Maybe I’ll have Claude do the historians next.

Related

  1. Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Anarcho-Capitalism: An Annotated Bibliography,” LewRockwell.com (Dec. 31, 2001). [↩]
  2. The mention counts it worked from are rough and somewhat inflated, since several of Hoppe’s methodological essays, such as “On Praxeology and the Praxeological Foundation of Epistemology” and “In Defense of Extreme Rationalism,” are reprinted across ESAM, EEPP, and TGF. [↩]
  3. See Kinsella, How long copyright terms make art disappear, C4SIF Blog (July 6, 2013).  [↩]
  4. See Hoppe, “My Path to the Austrian School of Economics,” in TGF, p. 547. [↩]
  5. ESH, p. 81. [↩]
  6. Community and Power is the 1962 retitled edition of The Quest for Community (1953), the title listed in Hoppe’s bibliography. [↩]

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