By PFS member Martín C. Gamazo. For further resources, see Stephan Kinsella, “Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide” (2011) and Supplemental Resources,” StephanKinsella.com (Jan. 1, 2015).
Martín C. Gamazo, “Natural Law Theory, Consequentialism, and Argumentation Ethics: A Response to Olav Dirkmaat,” Property and Freedom Journal (July 3, 2026)
Olav Dirkmaat recently published an article comparing natural law theory (iusnaturalismo) with consequentialism, arguing that the former is mistaken and the latter is the correct way to justify libertarianism.[1] In this response, we will set aside several problems with the article, such as the fact that at no point does it present, even in summary form, a libertarian natural-law theory, such as the one developed by Murray Rothbard.[2] We will focus on two aspects of his article: his justification of consequentialism and his critique of Hans-Hermann Hoppe’s Argumentation Ethics.
In his article, Dirkmaat states the following:
The only definitive answer to the question of whether a set of rules produces good or bad consequences is offered by the long-term survival of the collective […] Rule consequentialism must be a principle of civilizational preservation, where the continuity of society depends on the collective capacity to create wealth.[3]
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