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PFP362 | Rahim Taghizadegan: Paternalism and Liberty in an Age of Infantilization (PFS 2026)

Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 362.

This talk is from the recently-concluded PFS 2026 Twentieth Annual Meeting (Sep. 17–22, 2026, Bodrum, Turkey).

Rahim Taghizadegan (Austria/Switzerland), Paternalism and Liberty in an Age of Infantilization.

Taghizadegan takes issue with the “Whig,” too-good-to-be-true classical-liberal story of liberty as an ever-expanding license to do as one likes. The roots of the word (Latin liberi, Greek eleutheros, Persian azadi) all point to being born into a lineage, and so to not being ownable; self-ownership, he argues, is above all a burden of responsibility. Building on Tocqueville’s prophecy of a mild, tutelary despotism that keeps citizens in perpetual childhood, and on Röpke, Erhard, and Adolf Reinach on the cultural and promissory foundations of cooperation, he diagnoses a society of infantilized “fatherless children.” He then asks what follows: adoption, with liability for those who invite and provide, or institutionalization and its grim corollaries of discrimination and separation.

An edited transcript is appended below.

Other talks will appear on the Property and Freedom Podcast weekly, on Mondays, in upcoming weeks. Other videos may also be found at the PFS 2026 Youtube Playlist.

Related

Edited transcript below.

Paternalism and Liberty in an Age of Infantilization

Based on the transcript of the talk presented at the PFS 2026 Twentieth Annual Meeting • Sep. 18, 2026 • Bodrum, Turkey

by Rahim Taghizadegan

Thank you very much, Hans, and thank you, Gülçin, for having me here again after twenty years—quite a long time. There’s always a risk when speaking before such an audience, and my risk today is that speaking about freedom at the Property and Freedom Society is a bit like carrying owls to Athens. But I don’t like to be a bore, so I will take a somewhat critical stance on liberty. In particular, I will take issue with some classical liberal exaggerations.

Those exaggerations are exaggerations because they follow the Whig theory of progress. If you’ve read Rothbard, you know the term goes back to Butterfield and his analysis of a large part of the classical liberal tradition. The Whig theory of progress sounds a bit too good to be true, and that’s what it is. In the normative sense, of course, I’m very much aligned with progress, because it’s tautological: things getting better is better—sure, we can all agree on that. The problem is mistaking it for a description: that what is more recent is better, and that there is some kind of underlying historical determinism, a promised utopia of liberty in some distant future, where everyone will be free to do as he likes once we have finally got rid of all the shackles and bondage of history. That, of course, is an exaggeration. There is no straight line of things getting better; sometimes they get worse. And it is part of the core of the Austrian School to be realist—not to be pessimist, not to be cynical, but to be realist and tell things as they are.

The issue with liberty is that it has gone a bit astray from its etymological origins, which are very hard for a modern person to grasp. Libertas is related to liberi, and those were the children. That seems very odd. A modern understanding would be “free as a child.” No: for the Romans, being one of the liberi meant being born into the patria potestas, into paternal rule. But there is still a crucial link to what we may consider the propertarian tradition of freedom. Being liberi—and the very same in ancient Greek, being eleutheroi, and eleutheria, freedom, and the very same in the ancient root priyo, which has come into English and German as free and frei—all mean being born into a lineage: having ancestors. You could add “freeborn,” but that would be a pleonasm.

What does it mean? It means you cannot be owned. Someone who is not born into a lineage can be owned. He is like an orphan: someone of whom you don’t know whether he is friend or foe, just some human being who appears out of nowhere. And so in the older, more barbaric traditions, maybe you could own such people. Of course, it was a kind of privatized way to handle the risk that they might be foes. It is still the same in modern Persian: azadi, freedom, is related to zade, which is part of my name and means born into a lineage. Exactly the same thing in all these traditions.

Not being owned—that you cannot be owned—sounds great. But we know that liberty in the positive sense, the sense we can all appreciate, is self-ownership. And if liberty is understood as a promise, it is quite dangerous. I think this is one of the reasons why socialism so frequently followed in the wake of classical liberalism: if you think liberty means “I can do what I want,” it may also come to mean “I may have what I want, eventually.” And there is a risk with individualism when it is misunderstood—not in the sense of the methodological, realist individualism of the Austrian School, but as a kind of narcissism, meaning the world centers around me as an individual, and I can just take my fair share of what’s there. That leads to a misunderstanding of the structure of society.

Let me give you an example. Many people may think, “Oh, it would be wonderful to own a hotel like this one. I could be on holiday every day.” If you’ve talked to Gülçin over the years, you realize that it doesn’t seem that wonderful. Why? Because you are responsible. You’re responsible for hundreds of things that can go wrong every day if you’re running a real hotel. If you’re the real owner of a real hotel, it’s a burden—a huge burden of responsibility.

That means self-ownership is a bit oversold. It’s like, “Oh, cool, I get to be whatever I like.” No: self-ownership means responsibility. You take responsibility for yourself, and that’s quite a burden. I think that is why we are mistaken in assuming that liberty—which I think has had some good marketing—is a universally attractive idea. Of course, if we listen to political speeches, there are very few politicians who would say, “Oh, liberty is really a bad thing; we need to go after your liberties.” Everyone is in favor of liberty these days, because it seems like a free promise, a free-for-all. But once you see that it is actually a burden of responsibility, you realize that very few really want it.

It is very similar to what Mises realized about entrepreneurship. He saw, of course, that everyone is an entrepreneur in the broadest sense, because everyone has to bear the burden of uncertainty. Uncertainty is universal. But in the narrower sense—bearing the burden of uncertainty for additional factors of production, for people other than yourself—you realize, oh, shit, it’s difficult enough to bear that burden just for myself, for my own decisions, for my own life. Particularly in uncertain times like these, most people are overwhelmed with making day-to-day decisions under so much uncertainty. And then you see that being an entrepreneur does not mean “I’m rich and I can do what I want.” It means I have the worst boss imaginable: you can’t be sick, you can’t go on holiday, you’ve got to work. It is really the worst kind of bondage you can imagine—if you have the wrong understanding of liberty.

I think the most prophetic lines ever written in political theory came from a predecessor of Hans Hoppe, who long before Hans approached modern democracy in a very realist way, just looking at things as they are and describing them, not infused with the normative associations that usually go back to a deep misunderstanding of ancient thought and history. That was Alexis de Tocqueville, when he wrote about modern democracy. He wrote, in effect: it sounds very great—liberty for all, the land of the free, American democracy—but I see a new kind of despotism. At first it seems nice. It seems very mild; it does not torment people. But being mild, it progresses gradually—not a good kind of progress—replacing something.

So it is this mild despotism, and he compared this kind of modern paternalism with real paternity, with the real responsibility of a parent. He said it looks at first like fatherly care—or, one could say these days, motherly care—as if it really intended to help the child flourish and become independent. Because that is true fatherly care: you want to raise a grown-up; you don’t want to keep an eternal child. This mild despotism is the opposite. It has an interest in keeping people dependent. It takes care; it all sounds like care; it sounds very social, how it takes care of people. But actually it is very narcissistic, in a sense. You want dependence, because from dependence you get status, you get recognition. In this modern churning society—Anthony de Jasay called it “churning,” like the churning of butter—being the provider of other people brings you income.

Being a child means, in the economic sense, that you cannot be relied on to provide for yourself. It is difficult for a child to provide for himself, particularly if he is to flourish. That is why children have providers who feel responsible for providing for them and caring for them—but only for so long, and with a view to their flourishing on their own. This mild despotism has in fact led to something that Hans has called, I think, eternal adolescence—eternal adolescents walking around. And I think that if there is the kind of progress Tocqueville described, it is not even adolescents anymore; it is infants roaming around. I see that as the biggest challenge to liberty and self-ownership: when a crucial part of society becomes infantilized in that sense.

Tocqueville was also very prophetic in saying that once the state has taken over all the care, there will be no need for people to think for themselves and use their own reason, no need to decide on their own. And then he prophesied that eventually the whole economy would be regulated; he really did speak of regulation as coming out of that wrong kind of care. And he said that it would be in vain to give these infantilized people a voice in choosing their representatives every four or five years—that was like adding mockery to the harm that had been done. I find all these lines and predictions unusually prophetic. Everything has more or less come true.

What does it mean to have infants? Not only people who are unable to provide for themselves, but also people who are potentially unable to fulfill one condition of the catallactic order, a condition closely linked to providing for yourself. Providing for oneself is no easy task, but it is made much easier by cooperation. That is why our vision—the vision of the Austrian School, with its methodological individualism—is very social. It appreciates that 97% of all wealth was created through the division of labor, through cooperating with people we don’t know and may not even trust.

But I think there is a fundamental insight from people like Wilhelm Röpke, who was deeply influenced by the Austrian School but was a bit worried that it did not look enough at the cultural foundations of catallaxy. Sometimes, of course, the cultural foundations and the results are at odds, and that leads to the paradox that some of the wealthiest places are the most despotic, in Tocqueville’s sense. This is because one of the conditions of catallactic cooperation is trust: trusting people to fulfill their promises. The higher the trust, the less friction in cooperation. That means societies that develop, through a long cultural process, into high-trust societies will have better foundations for cooperation and will thus be wealthier in the long run—which is exactly what happened.

Now, Röpke was the biggest influence on Ludwig Erhard, who is famous for having brought the market back to West Germany. I think he is a bit overrated, but still, for a politician, he was at least interested in its foundations. And in the 1960s he realized: “Oh my God, we’ve done it all wrong. It was not enough to bring free price fluctuations into our society and to have just the outward structures of a market. We were lacking the foundations, and in a way we were undermining them.” Because the wealth created through cooperation can lead to entitlement if you don’t see and understand where it comes from. It is like the child who grows up in wealth, which is one of the big parental challenges in raising a child in the Western world: the child can grow into entitlement. And that is exactly what happened in Germany, of course: “We are getting so wealthy, we are the world’s leading country, and liberty means we are all entitled, without condition, to the fruits of the liberty we all cherish.”

So he proposed a term different from the one he originally used, the “social market economy,” which was quite misleading. Of course, he meant it in the original meaning of “social”: he said the market economy is social because it is a market economy, because it fosters cooperation between people—that is why it is social. And the most antisocial thing you can imagine is the welfare state, where you benefit from the neediness of other people for your wealth and income—not through voluntary cooperation, but by providing for people with other people’s money. There is nothing more antisocial than that.

But the term he proposed, I think, was a stupid one, so it didn’t catch on, and anyway it was too late. He said we should rather talk about the formierte Gesellschaft. That’s stupid: it’s hard to pronounce, you can’t really translate it, and no one in Germany will really understand it either. He meant it as a counter-position to the narcissistic entitlement society, where you say, “Okay, there’s wealth; now I’ve got to figure out my interest, and then figure out my share.” It is all democratic and peaceful, of course, because everyone gets his fair share. And that was the development: the majority of the population in most Western countries now assumes that it is getting its fair share of the plunder—which is not plunder, of course; they’re just getting their fair share. So what he meant by formierte Gesellschaft is better translated as a self-aligning society, or a self-aligning cooperative society, in which you understand that there are preconditions for wealth, and that some of these preconditions are cultural.

Here I want to refer to someone who will be spoken about later in this meeting: Adolf Reinach, who realized that when we say something, it is not just a subjective utterance. There are social acts—not, of course, in the sense of the modern welfare state—social acts that create objective social realities. It is not just the subjective expression of my wants, “I want that,” “I like that.” Through speech, writing, and action we are able to create objective realities, such as obligations. When we make a promise, it is a subjective utterance of something we would like to see, or think we can bring about. But we create something real, something objective: a mutual obligation, which is a basis of cooperation, of win-win creation. And of course it requires the capacity and willingness to understand the responsibility you take on when uttering certain things. It is part of self-ownership to own the consequences of your utterances and social acts. And that, of course, is the basis of a cooperative society.

Now, if Tocqueville is right, I think we would expect to see a surge of what I would call orphans: fatherless children. And I think that is exactly what has happened. When talking about liberty and responsibility, we need to face this challenge: out of a misunderstanding of liberty, we have potentially grown into a society of fatherless children.

And how would you cope with a society of fatherless children? Children are great, of course, because they have the potential to engage in cooperation. But fatherless children are an issue, because they don’t have a natural provider. They don’t have someone who naturally feels responsible for their upbringing and for their actions. That is why, in some public spaces, we see signs that say, “Attention: parents are liable for their children,” or that children may not enter—not only because it is risky for the children, since we assume they are not yet properly capable of judging dangers and the consequences of their own actions. That is part of the protective realm of the child, which was a relatively recent invention. The category of the child was created for the protection of the child, so that its liability is reduced—compensated, of course, by parental liability. That allows us to interact freely with children and not limit too much where they may go and what they may handle, because we rely on the liability of the parents to take proper care. And we expect children to become persons like everyone else, who will potentially enter into catallactic, cooperative obligations later on.

If that is no longer the case, I think legal theory gives us only two ways to cope with a sudden surge of orphans. First, of course, you want to figure out what is going on. Usually it’s an indication of war—I assume it’s an indication of civil war. I think most Western societies are in a state of civil war without realizing it, because of this mild despotism, which, exactly as Tocqueville said, would not need violence, at least not open violence. There is also the majority’s illusion that it is the beneficiary of the situation, which of course helps keep things peaceful, because there seems to be overwhelming power and force doing this plundering, legalizing the plundering, and restricting the liberty of people who would very well be in a position to own themselves and own the consequences of their actions.

But if you can’t yet figure out what is going on, and can’t figure out how to stop it, you have to deal with it. There are two ways to deal with it. One is adoption, and the other is institutionalization, which is of course the worst; you want to hope for adoption. And from the legal theory we are very fond of, I think adoption can be a quite charitable private endeavor, if it is voluntary. It means that you take over not only the responsibility to provide for someone, but also liability for that person.

I think that is very much in line with what Hans has proposed regarding the problem of migration. He said: if you want to invite guests, that’s no issue; we just need to make sure who is liable—whose responsibility it is if what you considered a friend turns out to be a foe, or even worse. And I think the biggest danger in our infantilized society is that those who are invited as guests are actually combatants—actually at war.

Being at war is very natural; I’m not blaming a particular kind of society. But look into the recent pattern of femicides that everyone writes about. Of course, the mainstream tells us it shows how evil men are, as proven every day. These killings arise mostly out of relationships, out of failed relationships. If we had a traditional understanding of relationships, the parents of the soon-to-be-killed, not-yet wife would talk to the parents of the man, and they would figure out that actually his tribe is at war with theirs. They would figure out that the woman is perceived as an unowned person, because no father or brother is taking care of her. And that is exactly how these would-be killers of women in the West perceive them. It is not that they have evil intentions in that sense; they see these women as unowned property, or as spoils of war. If you are really empathically interested and want, neutrally, to understand what is going on in the minds of people who would kill someone, you would realize: okay, that’s quite interesting—that’s the situation of a combatant. It’s like tribes at war.

And then, if you look at liability, I think you would have to conclude that everyone who is a provider bears responsibility. The provider can be not only someone who provides the material support, even if not from his own funds, but also someone who has responsibility because he or she decides on it, or who even publicly invites certain kinds of people. I think it’s only fair that they bear that responsibility.

And I would extend this to another phenomenon, what I call the zombification around train stations in Western Europe, where you see literal zombies. Of course, I don’t mean to denigrate any human person. But we see an increased probability that someone who seems like a bum, who just needs provision and care, is actually deeply psychotic, and it may just so happen that his or her use of public space leads to a “knife incident,” as they call it these days—quite a regular occurrence nowadays.

I would say there must be some kind of responsibility, because otherwise we have the problem of more and more people being judgment-proof—that’s the term. If you have a society of children, and children are not able to provide for themselves, you can’t really punish them, because what would they pay as a penalty? That is called being judgment-proof. But I think it was Stephan Kinsella who argued that, in such a case, someone who aids the perpetrator—for example, by providing for him—is complicit in the act. And it can’t be that someone complicit in an act gets away scot-free just because the perpetrator was judgment-proof, because he had nothing with which to pay. Then of course the complicit person would have to take over a larger share of restitution to the victims, which is the most just and social understanding of what punishment is for, and of what the consequences of your actions should be: making right the harm done to the victim.

In many cases you can’t really control for that, because there is a risk that someone, out of nothing, will cause a knife incident or some other act of aggression. Then of course you have to draw conclusions, if these people can’t be adopted privately. And I think a large part of the responsibility could still be attributed to the people who just bask in the status and income they get from the people they are nurturing and helping—sometimes in the name of charity, which is the better form of it, or, in the worst form, as a kind of legal obligation, where you hand someone 800 euros a month and get ten times that amount in income and status because you are helping the poor—which, of course, those being helped usually dislike.

We have a very recent case in Germany which I think makes it quite obvious what may happen. One immigrant realized: okay, they are providing for me, but now they feel entitled to control my life and take away my children, because they think I have harmed my children. And then he just went and killed six social workers for not accepting their authority over him—just because they provided for him. And interestingly, the person who drove the getaway car after the murders was the mother-in-law of the social bureaucrat in charge, whose title translates into proper English, I’d say, as “government representative for giving migrants their fair share of the plunder.” I think that is the exact translation of the title. And of course the ethnicity doesn’t really add much to the picture, if you look at the general pattern of infantilization, which means that no one owns up to the terrible results of their actions and their provisions.

And if there are too many orphans, and you can’t have adoption, and you can’t have enough responsibility, it means some kind of institutionalization. That sounds terrible, and we have had it in history. But it means that if you are surrounded by people who are potentially a threat to society, the results will usually be considered, from the classical liberal perspective, some of the worst things imaginable. They sound terrible, but I think they are just the result of a realist assessment. Those terms are prejudice, discrimination, and physical separation. You all know these terms. And in the end they are only the result of the incapacity of a social order to deal with infantilization on a large scale—with the wrong kind of paternalism, which eventually brings its own legitimacy, because liberty seems impossible. Then you have only the trade-off: either you institutionalize the whole society through complete surveillance and tracking, or you need to understand that some societies may be in a state of civil war, and that it takes other forms of segregation to deal with this and to attribute proper responsibility for what is happening in those societies.

Thank you for your attention.

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