Kinsella, “Mises, Rothbard, Hoppe: An Indispensable Framework”

by Stephan Kinsella on March 2, 2026

— From Rothbard at 100: A Tribute and Assessment, Stephan Kinsella and Hans-Hermann Hoppe, eds. (Houston: Papinian Press and Property and Freedom Society, 2026) —

Mises, Rothbard, Hoppe: An Indispensable Framework

Stephan Kinsella¹

Personal Note

I had the good fortune to meet Murray Rothbard in person—only once, but still. I had been an Ayn Rand-influenced libertarian from about age fifteen, around 1980, and a Rothbardian anarchist and growing devotee of the ideas of Ludwig von Mises by law school, in 1988. And it was that first year in law school that I encountered the ideas of Hans-Hermann Hoppe—his argumentation ethics presented in the pages of Liberty magazine.² And then I was off to the races.

As I recounted elsewhere,

By mid-1994 I had moved [from Houston] to Philadelphia …, and resolved to attend the John Randolph Club meeting in October 1994, near Washington, D.C., which was a gathering of paleoconservatives from the Chronicles crowd and several libertarians associated with the Mises Institute …. My primary goal was to meet Hoppe, Rothbard, and [Lew] Rockwell. I was thrilled to meet them and other scholars associated with the Mises Institute, and was able to get Murray to autograph my copy of Man, Economy, and State, which he inscribed “To Stephan: For Man & Economy, and against the state –Best regards, Murray Rothbard.”³

Murray and I talked for quite a while alone in an auditorium before others filed in. Of course I did not know he was soon to pass, just three months later. But like the other contributors to this Gedenkschrift, his ideas, his brilliance, his passion for liberty—shaped my intellectual life. Perhaps next to Hans, who stood on Rothbard’s shoulders and extended and built on his work, he is my greatest intellectual influence. I shall forever be in his debt.

In this paper, I will briefly explore the central importance of this trio—Mises, Rothbard, Hoppe—to developing a sound understanding of our complex socio-political world, with an emphasis on Rothbard.

But this concept of attribution, of giving credit to the source of one’s ideas, inspires me to first make a little detour (which also may serve as an illustration of the power of their intellectual framework).

Excursus: The Role of Ideas in Human Action

One presupposition of intellectual activism, discourse, and inquiry is that ideas matter: that others can be persuaded. That the ideas that they hold matter. That acquiring knowledge is possible, that learning is possible.

This is implied by the structure of human action itself—the praxeology systematically developed by Mises—since all successful action requires not only the availability, use, possession, and employment of available, causally efficacious scarce means of action (resources), but also the possession of knowledge to guide one’s actions. Knowledge is a core aspect of action, equally important to scarce means of action, but it receives somewhat short shrift from economists, who (understandably) tend to focus on production of consumer goods and the use of means in a world of scarcity. But we cannot forget that action is inconceivable without both means to employ and knowledge to guide the use of the means. This knowledge includes knowledge of causal laws, of contingent facts about the world, about possible ends to pursue, about recipes and technology, and about possible means that can be wielded to achieve one’s ends.

As Rothbard writes,

There is another unique type of factor of production that is indispensable in every stage of every production process. This is the “technological idea” of how to proceed from one stage to another and finally to arrive at the desired consumers’ good. This is but an application of the analysis above, namely, that for any action, there must be some plan or idea of the actor about how to use things as means, as definite pathways, to desired ends. Without such plans or ideas, there would be no action. These plans may be called recipes; they are ideas of recipes that the actor uses to arrive at his goal. A recipe must be present at each stage of each production process from which the actor proceeds to a later stage. The actor must have a recipe for transforming iron into steel, wheat into flour, bread and ham into sandwiches, etc.⁴

(Incidentally, as for of economists giving short shrift to knowledge in favor of scarce means: note that although Rothbard here adverts to the role of recipes and ideas—knowledge—as a crucial component of action, this comment is contained, almost as an afterthought, in a section entitled “Further Implications: The Means,” not in its own separate section.)

Ideas and knowledge are necessary in a world of uncertainty, namely a world where actors constantly face an uncertain future. The impossible construct of the evenly-rotating economy is useful for analysis,⁵ but in reality action is always aimed at an uncertain future. By employing means guided by knowledge, successful action, or (psychic) profit, is possible, since actors have some knowledge and some means available. But as actors are not omniscient loss or failure is also possible. This is a point emphasized by Hoppe, who notes that “[o]nly a middle-of-the-road position between the two extremes of perfect knowledge and perfect ignorance is consistently defensible.”⁶

Just as the possession of knowledge is essential for successful human action, the possession of more and better knowledge expands the scope of successful human action. Learning—acquiring more and more useful knowledge—is thus essential to human progress. Even in a world of finite material resources, humans can achieve more, produce more, and have more successful action with the accumulation of more knowledge. This is one reason humans today are wealthier than our ancestors; there is an ever-growing “fund of experience,” as Hayek called it, or pool of knowledge and ideas to draw on, to make action more efficient.⁷ We are not smarter than the ancient Romans; we just have more recipes at our disposal. Knowledge is indeed power.

This distinction between the roles of scarce means of action and knowledge explains why property rights are necessary and emerge for resources but why intellectual property (IP) rights are destructive and unjustified.⁸ All actors employ (use; possess) scarce means when acting, when engaging in production. This is true even of Crusoe alone on his island, who has possession of means—but no property rights. Crusoe uses scarce means and knowledge to achieve his ends.

In the presence of other actors—in society—actors may also cooperate and trade with each other, but because of the nature of scarce resources, conflict is also possible. The use by an actor of a resource is exclusive in the sense that one actor’s use excludes that of another. And thus in a society where the prevailing ethos values the flourishing of all, cooperation, peaceful interaction, and the ability to acquire (and trade) unused resources, and disvalues violent conflict, property rights emerge as a normative support to enable actors to employ resources peacefully and productively, without conflict or with reduced conflict.⁹ In other words, because conflict is possible over resources, property rights arise, as a practical solution, in response to this possibility.¹⁰

By contrast, there can be no conflict over the knowledge that guides action. The same knowledge of recipes, facts, causal knowledge, and so on can be used by any number of actors in guiding the use of their own possessed means. This is, in fact, why future generations are wealthier than their ancestors; the fund of experience accumulates and grows and enhances the efficiency of everyone’s action. By attempting to treat non-scarce knowledge with property rights that emerge to solve the possibility of conflict over the use of scarce means, IP laws actually violate property rights and engender conflict. Thus, as I wrote previously:

It is obscene to undermine the glorious operation of the market in producing wealth and abundance by imposing artificial scarcity on human knowledge and learning…. Learning, emulation, and information are good. It is good that information can be reproduced, retained, spread, and taught and learned and communicated so easily. Granted, we cannot say that it is bad that the world of physical resources is one of scarcity—this is the way reality is, after all—but it is certainly a challenge, and it makes life a struggle. It is suicidal and foolish to try to hamper one of our most important tools—learning, emulation, knowledge—by imposing scarcity on it. Intellectual property is theft. Intellectual property is statism. Intellectual property is death. Give us intellectual freedom instead!¹¹

In a just property rights system, the owner of a given resource can be identified—the person who first acquired it from its unowned state, or who acquired from a previous owner by contract—with the presumption being that the current possessor is the owner.¹² IP law, such as patent and copyright, attempts to mimic the property rights treatment of scarce resources when granting IP rights. But in a dispute over scarce resources, the owner of the resource in dispute can be determined by objective rules since the resource in dispute has objective borders and its possessor and first user can be determined in accordance with these fundamental rules of property acquisition.¹³

The same is not true of knowledge and ideas. As the bulk of ideas we use were developed by past generations for millennia, it is usually impossible to know the provenance of an idea—who invented fire, say, the wheel, wearing clothes, making boats, and so on. And many ideas and innovations are discovered, or re-discovered, by many people, and used by countless actors simultaneously.

It is true that social convention may require attribution and credit where this is feasible and possible and useful. We know Da Vinci painted the Mona Lisa, that Newton and Leibniz came up with the calculus, that Edison was one of the inventors of the lightbulb, that Englishman William Stanley Jevons, Austrian Carl Menger, Frenchman Léon Walras in Switzerland, and American John Bates Clark pioneered marginal utility theory. But it is not always possible to know where useful ideas come from. What is more important is to know what works and how to use resources efficiently and efficaciously.

Not only is it not always possible to identify the origin of useful information, fortunately it is also not necessary to identify where an idea came from in order to avoid conflict, since no conflict in the use of ideas is possible. (Likewise, when it is casually asserted that people “fight over religion,” this is not really accurate. Disagreements over religion are the reason people fight (the values or purposes that motivate action), but action always is physical conflict over scarce resources.¹⁴ Just as human rights, individual rights, just are property rights, as Rothbard observes (see more on this below). In a just world, all publicly available knowledge can be used freely, without permission. There is no such thing as “theft” of knowledge, as it cannot be owned; there can be no conflict over it. It is impossible to own knowledge.¹⁵ The matter of identifying the source of an idea, of giving credit or attribution, is not a matter of justice but merely one of social convention.¹⁶

Consider the case of Murray Rothbard, who escaped the Randian orbit early in his intellectual development and became the important thinker to whom this volume pays tribute. Despite the Randians condemning Rothbard for his anarchism, because of their wrong-headed allegiance to the idea of IP—that ideas can be possessed and owned like scarce resources—Rothbard is accused of “stealing” ideas he “got from” Ayn Rand. But ideas cannot be owned or stolen, and the bulk of ideas shared by Rand and Rothbard can also be traced back to earlier thinkers, as Rothbard himself pointed out.¹⁷

In short, ideas cannot be owned; and there can be no general obligation to identify the source or origin of one’s ideas; nor is this always possible or even useful. If we needed to drop a footnote giving attribution or asking permission each time we use an idea, nothing would get done. Life would look like one of my articles or books, which are festooned with footnotes that “run along, like little angry dogs barking at the text.”¹⁸ It would grind to a halt if you had to attribute an idea before using it—or, worse, get permission from an IP owner before using it.¹⁹

The Ideas of Mises, Rothbard, and Hoppe

All that said … it nonetheless sometimes can be useful and helpful to understand where one’s ideas came from, in one’s personal history, and to give credit and acknowledgment where possible and appropriate. After all, to paraphrase Socrates, the unexamined intellectual life is not worth living.

In my own case, as noted above, I have been a libertarian since about 1980, when I first read the work of Ayn Rand in high school. Modern libertarianism has been around for about six or seven decades, since the 1960s and 1970s, and of course was built on earlier ideas—those of the classical liberals and even earlier thinkers.²⁰ There were numerous prominent contributors to libertarian ideas at its inception, including Ayn Rand and others, and there are far more voices today, too many to identify or enumerate. My own understanding of libertarian principles, as presented in my 2023 book Legal Foundations of a Free Society, is based the influence and ideas of countless thinkers—too many too footnote, though Lord knows that in my law-review type OCD compulsion, I’ve tried.²¹ With me, as with many other earlier libertarians of my generation, it began with Ayn Rand.²² It would be impossible to recall or identify all the books or thinkers I’ve drawn from, just as it would for anyone else. They include so many thinkers—Bastiat, the Tannehills, Hazlitt, Nozick, Spooner, and so on—as well as many non-libertarians and precursors. It is easy to note some, but impossible to be comprehensive.²³

In my mind, however, three stand out, looming in importance and significance over all others: Ludwig von Mises, Murray Rothbard, and Hans-Hermann Hoppe. (Many others contributing to this volume also draw heavily on these three. See, e.g., the chapters herein by Thomas Jacob, Lee Iglody, Alessandro Fusillo, Thorsten Polleit, and David Dürr.)²⁴ It is their ideas—of course, each influenced by countless others; Mises drawing on Menger and others, Rothbard building on Mises, Hoppe building on Mises and Rothbard²⁵—that in my mind are the most important and essential to developing a sound social and political theory. Their combined edifice of thought offers quite an indispensable framework, to paraphrase Rothbard’s dedication to his wife Joey in two of his books and from whence the subtitle of this chapter is taken.²⁶

It would of course be difficult to survey the combined thought of these thinkers in an entire book and impossible in a short article. I will highlight here some of the aspects of their thought I routinely draw from and find essential, focusing primarily on Rothbard.²⁷

Mises

I love so much of Mises’s work, both his economics and his classical liberal social thought, but it is his methodology and especially praxeology that I turn to over and over again and have found indispensable in my libertarian theorizing. Now praxeology is certainly necessary for sound economic analysis, to understand the implications of human action in a world of scarcity. As Hoppe points out,

Essentially, economic analysis consists of: (1) an understanding of the categories of action and an understanding of the meaning of a change in values, costs, technological knowledge, etc.; (2) a description of a situation in which these categories assume concrete meaning, where definite people are identified as actors with definite objects specified as their means of action, with definite goals identified as values and definite things specified as costs; and (3) a deduction of the consequences that result from the performance of some specified action in this situation, or of the consequences that result for an actor if this situation is changed in a specified way. And this deduction must yield a priori-valid conclusions, provided there is no flaw in the very process of deduction and the situation and the change introduced into it being given, and a priori—valid conclusions about reality if the situation and situation-change, as described, can themselves be identified as real, because then their validity would ultimately go back to the indisputable validity of the categories of action.²⁸

Libertarian legal theory involves not only descriptive economic analysis; it is also normative. It concerns the social problem of conflict in a world of scarce resources and norms and rules and laws—property rights—that are part of a just and prosperous society and social order. But all normative analysis, discussion of justice and property rights, and so on occurs against the backdrop of human action in a world of scarcity. It is for this reason that Mises’s praxeology is so important. And this is perhaps why my favorite work by Mises has long been one of his last, the one heaviest on methodology: The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science.²⁹ Other favorites, for the same reason, are Epistemological Problems of Economics, Human Action, Part I, and Theory and History, chs. 1–7.³⁰

Even though Mises did not advance any kind of comprehensive, deontological case for rights, his love of liberty, human freedom, and human flourishing, combined with his understanding of free market economics and the nature of production and the danger of state depredation, led him to a very strong consequentialist case for individual property rights.

In my view, as the purpose of property rights is pragmatic—to solve the problem of conflict in a world where society has pro-peace norms—a consequentialist approach can be compatible with a principled or deontological, natural rights approach. It need not suffer from the type of problems of utilitarianism, which is only one type of consequentialism.³¹ Mises was more of a consequentialist in this sense.³²

And even though he did not advance a comprehensive case for norms and rights, he recognized the difference since he was a careful thinker. He took seriously the idea that economics is descriptive and wertfrei (value-free), and that favoring property rights, peace, and so on is a value that does not come from understanding economics alone. Thus, unlike too many empiricists and positivists today, he recognized the distinction between (descriptive, economic) possession of (use; employment) a means or resource—which he dubbed catallactic ownership or sociological ownership—and juristic (normative) ownership. This is a distinction that is essential in going from economic understanding to political ethics.³³ This is another case where Mises’s thought is useful for libertarian theorizing; Hoppe himself carefully recognizes the distinction between economic and praxeological description when he uses a praxeological-type normative argument to justify libertarian property rights.

In any case, sound, free-market economics is necessary for normative, political, and legal theorizing, but it is Mises’s praxeology that is key. For me, anyway. This is one man’s take, after all.

Rothbard

Rothbard is the central modern libertarian figure. His thought was informed by that of Mises and also by Ayn Rand, by classical liberal thinkers, and other libertarians including Old Right figures. He developed a full-fledged defense of a totally free, anarcho-capitalist or anarcho-libertarian society, informed by sound (Misesian-Austrian) economics. His output was vast and most of it interconnected. For me the most important works for libertarian theorizing, and those that serve as the bridge between Mises and other classical liberals and libertarians, and Rothbard’s protégé and colleague Hans Hoppe, are: The Ethics of Liberty (1982); For a New Liberty (1973); the collection Economic Controversies, esp. Section One: Method; and parts of Power and Market.³⁴ I will highlight here just a few of some of his most interesting and notable insights and writings.

“Law, Property Rights, and Air Pollution,” in Economic Controversies (originally published 1982). This piece advanced the concept of the “relevant technological unit,” which I have drawn on in my own writing about property rights.³⁵

“Monopoly and Competition,” ch. 10 of Man, Economy and State (1962). In this chapter, Rothbard adopted a more radical and sound view of monopoly and antitrust law, from both an Austrian economic and libertarian perspective, than the more conventional view of Mises.³⁶

“Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics,” in Economic Controversies (1977), which emphasized that value is not a measurable, cardinal quantity that can be interpersonally compared.³⁷

Several chapters in The Ethics of Liberty (1982), to-wit: “Human Rights as Property Rights,” “Knowledge, True and False,” and “Property Rights and the Theory of Contracts.” In the first, Rothbard rightly emphasized that all human rights just are property rights, that is, rights to control homesteadable, material resources. In the second, he provided a powerful argument against defamation and libel law and associated reputation rights.³⁸ And in the last, he provided a revolutionary and pathbreaking reformation of contract theory.³⁹

“The End of Socialism and the Calculation Debate Revisited” (1991): “the entire Hayekian emphasis on ‘knowledge’ is misplaced and misconceived.” ⁴⁰ ‘Nuff said.

“Justice and Property Rights,” in The Logic of Action One (1974). This piece is full of insights.⁴¹ For example, it has proto-argumentation ethics insights, e.g., that when taking a position regarding a conflict over a resource, the economist cannot help but adopt some implicit theory of justice:

… we have two mutually exclusive claimants to the ownership of the hoop. If the economist agrees to endorse only Z’s sale of the hoop, then he is implicitly agreeing that Z has the just, and Y the unjust, claim to the hoop. And even if he continues to endorse the sale by Y, then he is implicitly maintaining another theory of property titles: namely, that theft is justified. Whichever way he decides, the economist cannot escape a judgment, a theory of justice in the ownership of property. [bold emphasis added]

It also includes his argument for self-ownership, an argument by elimination or by contradiction (pp. 353–354; bold emphasis added):⁴²

Let us consider the first principle: the right to self-ownership. This principle asserts the absolute right of each man, by virtue of his (or her) being a human being, to “own” his own body; that is, to control that body free of coercive interference. Since the nature of man is such that each individual must use his mind to learn about himself and the world, to select values, and to choose ends and means in order to survive and flourish, the right to self-ownership gives each man the right to perform these vital activities without being hampered and restricted by coercive molestation.

Consider, then, the alternatives — the consequences of denying each man the right to own his own person. There are only two alternatives: either (1) a certain class of people, A, have the right to own another class, B; or (2) everyone has the right to own his equal quotal share of everyone else. The first alternative implies that, while class A deserves the rights of being human, class B is in reality subhuman and, therefore, deserves no such rights. But since they are indeed human beings, the first alternative contradicts itself in denying natural human rights to one set of humans. Moreover, allowing class A to own class B means that the former is allowed to exploit and, therefore, to live parasitically at the expense of the latter; but, as economics can tell us, this parasitism itself violates the basic economic requirement for human survival: production and exchange.

The second alternative, which we might call “participatory communalism” or “communism,” holds that every man should have the right to own his equal quotal share of everyone else. If there are three billion people in the world, then everyone has the right to own one-three-billionth of every other person. In the first place, this ideal itself rests upon an absurdity — proclaiming that every man is entitled to own a part of everyone else and yet is not entitled to own himself. Second, we can picture the viability of such a world — a world in which no man is free to take any action whatever without prior approval or indeed command by everyone else in society. It should be clear that in that sort of “communist” world, no one would be able to do anything, and the human race would quickly perish.⁴³

“Nations by Consent: Deconstructing the Nation-State” (1994). Rothbard showed that he could change his views, this time becoming more skeptical of immigration because of changed circumstances.⁴⁴ What’s the expression? “When the facts change, I change my mind. What do you do, madam?”

“Beyond Is And Ought” (1988).⁴⁵ This is another example of Rothbard modifying his views, late in life. Here, he gives Hoppe’s argumentation ethics defense of libertarian rights his wholehearted endorsement, and admits it is superior to his previous natural rights approach:

Prof. Hans Hoppe, a fairly recent immigrant from West Germany, has brought an enormous gift to the American libertarian movement. In a dazzling breakthrough for political philosophy in general and for libertarianism in particular, he has managed to transcend the famous is/ought, fact/value dichotomy that has plagued philosophy since the days of the scholastics, and that had brought modern libertarianism into a tiresome deadlock. Not only that: Hans Hoppe has managed to establish the case for anarcho-capitalist-Lockean rights in an unprecedentedly hard-core manner, one that makes my own natural law/natural rights position seem almost wimpy in comparison.

… remarkably and extraordinarily, Hans Hoppe has proven me wrong. He has done it: he has deduced an anarcho-Lockean rights ethic from self-evident axioms. Not only that: he has demonstrated that, just like the action axiom itself, it is impossible to deny or disagree with the anarcho-Lockean rights ethic without falling immediately into self-contradiction and self-refutation. In other worlds, Hans Hoppe has brought to political ethics what Misesians are familiar with in praxeology and Aristotelian-Randians are familiar with in metaphysics: what we might call “hard-core axiomatics.” [bold emphasis added]

Now I have criticized what I regard of some of Rothbard’s missteps, namely on intellectual property⁴⁶ and contract theory (and related issues like debtor’s prison and inalienability).⁴⁷ As for the latter, Rothbard was a non-lawyer pioneering a radical new approach to contract theory, so it would be surprising if there were no rough patches or stumbles. I am confident Rothbard would have accepted my corrections on IP and contract theory, probably enthusiastically, wholeheartedly, and gratefully. Regarding IP, Hoppe wrote me: “I agree. No question. He was to close to the solution anyhow.”⁴⁸

Hoppe

Hoppe absorbed and adopted Misesian praxeology as well as Rothbard’s radical anarchist libertarianism.⁴⁹ Just as Rothbard and Mises are Hoppe’s greatest influences, Hoppe, building on and extending their own economic and social thought, is mine. Thus these three, with Hoppe as their culmination, represent the indispensable framework for a sound understanding of our complex world.

I have surveyed, relied on, and built on Hoppe’s insights in many previous publications. My book Legal Foundations of a Free Society is littered with Hoppe’s insights and arguments drawing on them.⁵⁰ The most key Hoppe works for me are A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, The Great Fiction, and Economic Science and the Austrian Method.⁵¹ I can only briefly note here some of Hoppe’s important contributions beyond those of Mises and Rothbard (especially as this book is devoted to Rothbard).

But to start, as Guido Hülsmann and I noted in our introduction to his 2009 Festschrift:

Hans-Hermann Hoppe is one of the most important scholars of our time. He has made pioneering contributions to sociology, economics, philosophy, and history.

… Among Professor Hoppe’s many achievements we should stress in particular his brilliant critique of positivist methodology as applied to the social sciences, a new praxeological approach to political philosophy, an encompassing comparative analysis of socialism and capitalism, and a theory of secession as a means of political reform. Most importantly, in his book Democracy: The God that Failed, Professor Hoppe has delivered a profound critique of democracy, as well as an original reinterpretation of Western history in the twentieth century, both of which have stirred international debate in academia and among the wider public. Other influential works from his pen have dealt with the role of migrations within a free society, and with the role of public intellectuals in political transformation processes. Moreover, he has excelled as an historian of thought and made path-breaking contributions to other areas such as monopoly theory; the theory of public goods; the sociology of taxation; the positive methodology of the social sciences; the theory of risk; the production of security; the transformation of formerly socialist countries; and the evolution of monetary institutions and their impact on international relations.⁵²

Like Rothbard, and contra Mises, Hoppe adopts a sounder and more radical view of monopoly and antitrust than that of Mises (see above discussion in connection with Rothbard’s key insights).

On other issue, my sense is that, from Rothbard’s weakness on IP, he somewhat lost the Misesian praxeological focus on scarcity; perhaps this is due to his more Aristotelian as opposed to the more Kantian approach of Mises and Hoppe. But back in 1988, even before the internet and IP became a big issue, before I had written on this issue (which did not begin until 1995), because of his deep understanding of praxeology Hoppe was able instantly to see that intellectual property—the owning of “ideas”—makes no sense.⁵³

This is an indication of how steeped Hoppe is in praxeology, as Mises himself was. As I wrote previously:

Many scholars influenced by Mises and Austrian economics give praxeology—Mises’s apriori logic of action—lip service. But more so than any other living thinker, Hoppe actually applies praxeology, one of the most powerful modes of scientific analysis yet discovered. It permeates his writing. His reasoning is rooted in it. Hoppe swims in the plasma of praxeology.⁵⁴

Praxeology informs all aspects of Hoppe’s theoretical edifice: not only economic theory and applications, but political theory, ethics, and epistemology. Thanks to the work of Mises and Hoppe, I have increasingly, over the years, begun to swim in that plasma too, yielding greater insights into libertarian and property principles and principles of justice.

In addition to swaying Rothbard with his original argument for rights and his reassessment of the immigration issue, as noted above, Hoppe challenged the prevailing Whig theory of history view that assumed that democracy, while imperfect, was unalloyed progress over the ancien régime. Lightly chiding Mises and Rothbard, he wrote: “although aware of the economic and ethical deficiencies of democracy, both Mises and Rothbard had a soft spot for democracy and tended to view the transition from monarchy to democracy as progress.”⁵⁵

We can also briefly mention here his important critiques of fractional-reserve banking,⁵⁶ criticism of Hayek’s economics (e.g., his “knowledge problem” focus)⁵⁷ and Hayek’s political ethics.⁵⁸

Conclusion

Hoppe humbly praises Mises’s and Rothbard’s genius:

And there was a certain amount of, I would say, jealousy, because, I mean, Rothbard was enormously bright. I’ve met bright people in my life, but the only person I’ve met whom I would consider to be a genius was Rothbard. He could tell you the [] content of every book in his library. And that was an enormous library. Whenever you would ask him about any strange subject, he could give you some suggestions on what to read. You felt like a little [an] uneducated person if you talked to him. So jealousy played a big role in explaining why it was that he was not treated like a genius, as he should have been treated.

… since I’m now 75, if I had to assess my general impact that I had on the world, I think it would make me most proud if people would say Hoppe is, in a way, the most important successor of Rothbard in the present age. It would make me enormously proud if that became the general view, even though I admit I’m not in the same league as Mises and Rothbard. Those two were geniuses. I’m a pretty bright guy. I contributed quite a bit to libertarian thought. But I would never, ever put myself in the same league as them. But since there is nobody in sight who is in the same league as they are for the time being, I’m a pretty good substitute for these two giants.⁵⁹

Hans’s humility can only be appreciated here, but in any case, the power of the ideas of these three thinkers is undeniable. We have been given a gift.

And just as Rothbard and Mises are Hoppe’s greatest influences, Hoppe, building on and extending their own economic and social thought, is mine. As I wrote previously:

The power of the Austro-libertarian framework is that it opens up new vistas of understanding in the social sciences. It permits clarity and understanding where before there was muddy water. Professor Hoppe is the best exemplar to date of this methodological approach; his system improves upon that even of his masters, Mises and Rothbard, if only because he has stood on their shoulders.⁶⁰

Thus these three thinkers, with Professor Hoppe as their culmination, represent the indispensable framework for a sound understanding of our complex world.

Stephan Kinsella, a founding member of the PFS, is a libertarian writer and retired attorney in Houston. His publications include Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023) (LFFS), Against Intellectual Property (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2008); A Life in Liberty: Liber Amicorum in Honor of Hans-Hermann Hoppe (co-editor, with Jörg Guido Hülsmann; Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2024); and International Investment, Political Risk, and Dispute Resolution: A Practitioner’s Guide, 2nd ed. (Oxford, 2020).

Most of my own publications cited here may be found at www.stephankinsella.com or www.c4sif.org/aip. I hereby grant a CC0, no rights reserved, license in this chapter. [↩]
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “The Ultimate Justification of the Private Property Ethic,” Liberty (September, 1988): 20–22 attracted a good deal of attention in a symposium, “Breakthrough or Buncombe?” in following issue (Nov. 1988), including Murray N. Rothbard, “Beyond Is And Ought,” Liberty (Nov. 1988): 44–45. For more on argumentation ethics, see Hans-Hermann Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism (Laissez Faire Books, 2013), ch. 7; idem, The Economics and Ethics of Private Property (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2006), chs. 11, 13; Stephan Kinsella, “Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide,” Mises Daily (May 27, 2011); idem, “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights,” “Defending Argumentation Ethics,” and “The Undeniable Morality of Capitalism,” all in Legal Foundations of a Free Society (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2023) (hereinafter LFFS). [↩]
Stephan Kinsella, ““How I Became a Libertarian,” in LFFS. See also idem, “On the Logic of Libertarianism and Why Intellectual Property Doesn’t Exist,” in LFFS, and Alan D. Bergman, Adopting Liberty: The Stephan Kinsella Story (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2025), ch. 7 (on attending the Randolph meeting and meeting Rothbard and Hoppe). [↩]
Man, Economy, and State, with Power and Market, Scholar’s ed., 2nd ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2009), in ch. 1.3, p. 11, in the subsection “Further Implications: The Means” (bold emphasis added). As Mises writes, “Action … is not simply behavior, but behavior begot by judgments of value, aiming at a definite end and guided by ideas concerning the suitability or unsuitability of definite means. Ludwig von Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science, p. 34 (emphasis added). See also Frank A. Fetter, Economics—Vol. 1: Economic Principles (NY: The Century Co., 1915), p. 465; Guido Hülsmann, “Knowledge, Judgment, and the Use of Property,” Rev. Austrian Econ. 10, no. 1 (1997): 23–48, p. 44; Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Foreword,” in Kinsella, LFFS, p. xv; and other related references in Thorsten Polleit’s chapter. Note that this praxeological focus on the role of knowledge in guiding action in the employment of means is distinct from Hayek’s focus on the relevance of the “dispersed nature” of knowledge, which some Misesians have criticized. See F.A. Hayek, “The Use of Knowledge in Society,” American Economic Review 35, no. 4 (Sept. 1945): 519–30; and Stephan Kinsella, “Knowledge vs. Calculation,” Mises Economics Blog (July 11, 2006); and the comments of Rothbard and Hoppe on Hayek quoted below. [↩]
See Stephan Kinsella, “On Property Rights in Superabundant Bananas and Property Rights as Normative Support for Possession,” StephanKinsella.com (April 19, 2025). [↩]
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “On Certainty and Uncertainty, Or: How Rational Can Our Expectations Be?”, in The Great Fiction: Property, Economy, Society, and the Politics of Decline, 2nd ed (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2021), p. 247. [↩]
See F.A. Hayek, The Constitution of Liberty: The Definitive Edition, Ronald Hamowy, ed., Volume 17 of The Collected Works of F. A. Hayek (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), ch. 3, pp. 97–98; Stephan Kinsella, “Law and Intellectual Property in a Stateless Society,” Part III.B, and Against Intellectual Property After Twenty Years: Looking Back and Looking Forward, Part IV.C, in LFFS; idem, “The Problem with Intellectual Property,” in Handbook of the Philosophical Foundations of Business Ethics, 2nd ed., Marianne Thejls Ziegler and Christoph Lütge, eds., Robert McGee, section ed. (Springer, forthcoming 2026); idem, “Libertarian and Lockean Creationism: Creation As a Source of Wealth, not Property Rights; Hayek’s “Fund of Experience”; the Distinction Between Scarce Means and Knowledge as Guides to Action,” C4SIF.org (May 6, 2025); idem, “Tucker, ‘Knowledge Is as Valuable as Physical Capital,’” C4SIF.org (March 27, 2017). [↩]
See generally Kinsella, “The Problem with Intellectual Property”; idem, “Law and Intellectual Property in a Stateless Society”; and idem, “Against Intellectual Property After Twenty Years.” [↩]
See Kinsella, “On Property Rights in Superabundant Bananas and Property Rights as Normative Support for Possession.” [↩]
See, e.g., Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Of Common, Public, and Private Property and the Rationale for Total Privatization,” in The Great Fiction, Part III. [↩]
Kinsella, “Against Intellectual Property After Twenty Years,” pp. 420–421. See also idem, “Libertarian and Lockean Creationism: Creation As a Source of Wealth, not Property Rights; Hayek’s “Fund of Experience”; the Distinction Between Scarce Means and Knowledge as Guides to Action,” C4SIF.org (May 6, 2025); idem, “The Patent Holocaust,” C4SIF.org (Oct. 8, 2025). [↩]
On this latter point, see Kinsella, “What Libertarianism Is,” in LFFS, pp. 22–23, n. 27. [↩]
See Kinsella, “What Libertarianism Is,” p. 25, n. 34 (bold emphasis added):

De Jasay’s “let exclusion stand” idea, along with the Hoppean emphasis on the prior-later distinction, sheds light on the nature of homesteading itself. Often the question is asked as to what types of acts constitute or are sufficient for homesteading (or “embordering” as Hoppe sometimes refers to it); what type of “labor” must be “mixed with” a thing; and to what property does the homesteading extend? What “counts” as “sufficient” homesteading? We can see that the answer to these questions is related to the issue of what is the thing in dispute. In other words, if B claims ownership of a thing possessed (or formerly possessed) by A, then the very framing of the dispute helps to identify what the thing is in dispute, and what counts as possession of it. If B claims ownership of a given resource, he wants the right to control it, to a certain extent, and according to its nature. Then the question becomes, did someone else previously control “it” (whatever is in dispute), according to its nature; i.e., did someone else already homestead it, so that B is only a latecomer? … [T]he physical nature of a given scarce resource and the way in which humans use such resources will determine the nature of actions needed to “control” it and exclude others. [↩]
Stephan Kinsella, “Against Intellectual Property After Twenty Years: Looking Back and Looking Forward,” in LFFS, p. 414 and n. 43; idem, “IP and Aggression as Limits on Property Rights: How They Differ,” StephanKinsella.com (Jan. 22, 2010). [↩]
IP rights are thus not actually property rights in information, but disguised assignments or takings of existing property rights, in the form of nonconsensual negative servitudes (or easements). See Kinsella, “Against Intellectual Property After Twenty Years,” Part IV.B; idem, “The Problem with Intellectual Property,” Part III.A.2; idem, “Intellectual Property Rights as Negative Servitudes,” C4SIF.org (June 23, 2011). [↩]
Note also that the alleged “right” to receive credit or attribution has nothing to do with IP rights, despite common misconceptions and claims to the contrary by confused, or dishonest, proponents of IP. Providing attribution does not overcome accusations of patent or copyright infringement, and failing to provide attribution is not an element of proving copyright or patent infringement. See Stephan Kinsella, “Copying, Patent Infringement, Copyright Infringement are not ‘Theft’, Stealing, Piracy, Plagiarism, Knocking Off, Ripping Off,” C4SIF.org (April 23, 2025). [↩]
See Daniel J. Flynn, “Murray Rothbard’s Lost Letters on Ayn Rand,” J. Libertarian Stud. 29, no. 2 (2025): 35–50, pp. 36–37; Stephan Kinsella, “Rothbard’s Objectivist Influences,” StephanKinsella.com (Nov. 4, 2025). [↩]
Legal scholar and lexicographer Bryan Garner notes that although footnotes can be useful, “you can hardly ignore, at the foot of every page, the notes that ‘run along, like little angry dogs barking at the text.’ These days, the notes are more likely Great Danes than chihuahuas.” Bryan A. Garner, The Elements of Legal Style, 2nd ed. (Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 93, quoting S.M. Crothers, “That History Should Be Readable,” in The Gentle Reader 172 (1903; repr. 1972); see also Stephan Kinsella, “All footnotes!”, StephanKinsella.com (Nov. 17, 2023). I plead guilty. [↩]
For further discussion of the necessity of objective property rules that can determine what resources may be used now, without having to wait for the approval of late-comers, see Stephan Kinsella, “How We Come To Own Ourselves,” in LFFS, Appendix. [↩]
See Stephan Kinsella, “Libertarianism After Fifty Years: What Have We Learned?”, in LFFS. [↩]
See Kinsella, “All footnotes!” [↩]
Jerome Tuccille, It Usually Begins with Ayn Rand (Stein and Day, 1971). [↩]
See some of my influences listed in Stephan Kinsella, “The Greatest Libertarian Books,” StephanKinsella.com (Aug. 7, 2006). [↩]
And even more explicitly by David Dürr in “The Inescapability of Law, and of Mises, Rothbard, and Hoppe,” J. Libertarian Stud. 23 (2019): 161–170; text; video. [↩]
As I note in my Preface, n.2, “I almost wish Hoppe had not discovered Mises until later in his own path to discovering economic science, to see how his own version of praxeology might have developed.” [↩]
See Murray N. Rothbard, America’s Great Depression, 5th ed. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2000 [1963]): “TO JOEY, the indispensable framework”; idem, For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto, 2nd ed. (2006 [1973]): “TO JOEY, still the indispensable framework.” I toyed with the idea of using the title “Mises, Rothbard, Hoppe: An Eternal Golden Braid,” after one of my favorite books, Douglas R. Hofstadter’s Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid (New York: Basic Books, 1979), but I figured no one would get it. [↩]
Just for kicks, I had ChatGPT take a look at the many citations in my heavily-footnoted 2023 book Legal Foundations of a Free Society to see if it would confirm what my main influences are. Its analysis recognized that Mises, Rothbard and Hoppe are by far my primary influences, in terms of number of citations and influence. According to the AI, “Rothbard is clearly the dominant citation source,” “as intellectual foundation” and for other topics; while “Hoppe is cited almost as frequently as Rothbard” on a number of topics. As for Mises, he “appears throughout” on issues such as methodology, praxeology, the socialism debate, property and economic calculation, and so on; “[h]e anchors the economic-theoretical dimension of your framework.” ChatGPT concludes that my “book is heavily Rothbard-Hoppe centered,” and is: Rothbardian in normative structure; Hoppean in argumentation and property grounding; and Misesian in methodology. Not bad for a dumb AI. [↩]
Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, p. 142. See also some related comments in Thorsten Polleit’s chapter. [↩]
Ludwig von Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science: An Essay on Method (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Company, Inc. 1962); see also Jörg Guido Hülsmann, Mises: The Last Knight of Liberalism (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2007), ch. 23, the section “Last Writings,” p. 1016 et seq. [↩]
Ludwig von Mises, Epistemological Problems of Economics, 3d ed., George Reisman, trans. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2003); idem, Human Action: A Treatise on Economics, Scholar’s ed. (Auburn, Ala: Mises Institute, 1998); idem, Theory and History: An Interpretation of Social and Economic Theory and Evolution (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2007 [1957]). [↩]
See, e.g., various problems with utilitarianism outlined in Kinsella, “The Problem with Intellectual Property,” Part III.B.). [↩]
See, on this, Kinsella, “Dialogical Arguments for Libertarian Rights,” pp. 114–115, n. 3 and idem, “Knowledge, Calculation, Conflict, and Law,” p. 505, both in LFFS; Randy E. Barnett, “Of Chickens and Eggs—The Compatibility of Moral Rights and Consequentialist Analyses,” Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol’y 12 (1989): 611–36; idem, “Introduction: Liberty vs. License,” in The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law, 2d ed. (Oxford, 2014). [↩]
See Kinsella, “A Selling Does Not Imply Ownership, and Vice-Versa: Dissection,” in LFFS, pp. 272, 277–278 et pass.; idem, “What Libertarianism Is,” p. 23. [↩]
Murray N. Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty (New York: New York University Press, 1998 [1982]); idem, Economic Controversies (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2011) (previously published as The Logic of Action, vols. I and II (Edward Elgar, 1997) ). On the importance of The Ethics of Liberty, see Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Murray N. Rothbard and the Ethics of Liberty,” in Rothbard, The Ethics of Liberty; idem, “Rothbardian Ethics,” in The Economics and Ethics of Private Property. For additional overviews of Rothbard’s œuvre, see also Hans-Hermann Hoppe, obituary of Rothbard, in Murray N. Rothbard: In Memoriam (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 1995) and idem, “Murray Rothbard, R.I.P.,” The Free Market 13, no. 3 (March 1995). [↩]
See Kinsella, “What Libertarianism Is,” pp. 24–25, n. 34; and idem, “Law and Intellectual Property in a Stateless Society,” n. 42 and “On Libertarian Legal Theory, Self-Ownership, and Drug Laws,” n. 39, both in LFFS. [↩]
See also Hoppe’s complementary views in A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, ch. 10, “Capitalist Production and the Problem of Monopoly.” [↩]
See, on this, Stephan Kinsella, “A Libertarian Theory of Contract: Title Transfer, Binding Promises, and Inalienability,” Part I.D, n. 19; and idem, “Against Intellectual Property After Twenty Years: Looking Back and Looking Forward,” Part IV.A, both in LFFS. See also idem, “Money Prices Not a Measure of Value,” StephanKinsella.com (July 21, 2025); Robert P. Murphy, “Why Austrians Stress Ordinal Utility,” Mises Wire (Feb. 3, 2022). [↩]
See Stephan Kinsella, “Defamation as a Type of Intellectual Property,” in A Life in Liberty: Liber Amicorum in Honor of Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Jörg Guido Hülsmann and Stephan Kinsella, eds. (Houston, Texas: Papinian Press, 2024). [↩]
See Kinsella, “A Libertarian Theory of Contract”; idem, “The Title-Transfer Theory of Contract,” in David Howden, ed., Palgrave Handbook of Misesian Austrian Economics (Palgrave, forthcoming 2025). [↩]
Murray N. Rothbard, “The End of Socialism and the Calculation Debate Revisited,” in Economic Controversies, p. 846. See also Kinsella, “Knowledge vs. Calculation,” and Hoppe’s related critique, noted below. [↩]
See discussion in Stephan Kinsella, “Justice and Property Rights: Rothbard on Scarcity, Property, Contracts…,” Libertarian Standard (Nov. 19, 2010). [↩]
See also similar arguments and comments in Rothbard, “Interpersonal Relations: Ownership and Aggression,” in The Ethics of Liberty. [↩]
See also similar reasoning in Hoppe, “Rothbardian Ethics,” pp. 383–84; idem, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism, pp. 169–70; idem, “The Ethics and Economics of Private Property,” in The Great Fiction, p. 17; Stephan Kinsella, “How We Come To Own Ourselves,” Appendix; idem, “Law and Intellectual Property in a Stateless Society,” n. 27; and idem, “Defending Argumentation Ethics,” at n. 31. [↩]
Murray N. Rothbard, “Nations by Consent: Deconstructing the Nation-State,” J. Libertarian Stud. 11, no. 1 (Fall 1994; pdf version): 1–10. Three years after Rothbard’s death, the Journal of Libertarian Studies, now under Hoppe’s editorship, featured a symposium issue (Vol. 13 no. 2, Summer 1998) on the immigration issue featuring the following, only one of whom (Walter Block) opposed all immigration restrictions: Ralph Raico, “Introduction,” pp. 135–136; Julian Simon, “Are There Grounds for Limiting Immigration?“, pp. 137–152; John Hospers, “A Libertarian Argument Against Opening Borders,” pp. 153–165; Walter Block, “A Libertarian Case for Free Immigration,” pp. 167–186; Jesús Huerta de Soto, “A Libertarian Theory of Free Immigration,” pp. 187–197; Tibor R. Machan, “Immigration Into A Free Society,” pp. 199–204; Gary North, “The Sanctuary Society and its Enemies,” pp. 205–219; Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “The Case for Free Trade and Restricted Immigration,” pp. 221–233 (also in The Great Fiction and published as “On Free Trade and Restricted Immigration” in idem, Democracy: The God That Failed (Transaction, 2001) ). See also idem, “On Free Immigration and Forced Integration,” LewRockwell.com (June 1, 1999) (also published in Chronicles (July 1, 1995) and in idem, Democracy: The God That Failed) ); and idem, “Natural Order, the State, and the Immigration Problem,” J. Libertarian Stud. 16, no. 1 (Winter 2002): 75-97 (also in The Great Fiction). [↩]
Murray N. Rothbard, “Beyond Is And Ought,” Liberty (Nov. 1988): 44–45. [↩]
Kinsella, Law and Intellectual Property in a Stateless Society,” Part III.C; idem, “The Problem with Intellectual Property,” Part III.C.2 and n. 73. [↩]
Kinsella, “A Libertarian Theory of Contract,” Part III.C; idem, “The Title-Transfer Theory of Contract,” Part VI.A et pass. [↩]
Stephan Kinsella, “Hoppe on Reisman and Rothbard on Intellectual Property,” StephanKinsella.com (Oct. 16, 2025). See also Kinsella, “A Libertarian Theory of Contract,” n. 52: “I suspect Rothbard would have come around on this issue [inalienability, implicit theft, debtor’s prison, etc.] had he lived longer. After all, he accepted Hoppe’s argumentation-ethics defense of rights as an improvement on his natural law-based defense. I believe he also would have come around on intellectual property. Alas.” [↩]
On other influences, see the bibliographies and notes in his key works, and Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Anarcho-Capitalism: An annotated bibliography,” LewRockwell.com (Dec. 31, 2001). [↩]
See also Stephan Kinsella, “Hoppe: A Précis,” StephanKinsella.com (June 23, 2017); Jörg Guido Hülsmann and Stephan Kinsella, “Preface,” in Hülsmann and Kinsella, eds., A Life in Liberty; idem, “Introduction,” in Property, Freedom, and Society: Essays in Honor of Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Jörg Guido Hülsmann and Stephan Kinsella, eds. (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 2009); Stephan Kinsella, “Foreword,” in Hoppe, A Theory of Socialism and Capitalism; idem, “Afterword,” in Hoppe, The Great Fiction; and my six-lecture Mises Academy course on Hoppe, available at “KOL153 | ‘The Social Theory of Hoppe: Lecture 1: Property Foundations (Mises Academy, 2011),’” Kinsella on Liberty Podcast (Oct. 16, 2014). [↩]
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, Economic Science and the Austrian Method (Auburn, Ala.: Mises Institute, 1995). [↩]
Hülsmann and Kinsella, “Introduction.” [↩]
Kinsella, “Hoppe on Reisman and Rothbard on Intellectual Property”; idem, “Hoppe on Intellectual Property,” StephanKinsella.com (Dec. 27, 2010); idem, “Foreword”; idem, “Afterword.” [↩]
Kinsella, “Afterword,” p. 571. As noted in the original text, here I am borrowing from a vivid metaphor from Shael Herman, “Detrimental Reliance in Louisiana Law–Past, Present, and Future (?): The Code Drafter’s Perspective,” Tulane L. Rev. 58:3 (1984), pp. 707–57, at 708–709, which observes that legal principles staked out by articles of a civil code embody a “plasma that bathes and nourishes an entire code and its institutions. The obligations articles are traditionally rich in analogies, making them, in Portalis’ famous phrase, ‘fertile in effects.’” See also idem, “Minor Risks and Major Rewards: Civilian Codification in North America on the Eve of the Twenty-First Century,” Tulane Eur. & Civ. L. Forum 8 (1993), 63, at 67 n. 11; idem, The Louisiana Civil Code: A European Legacy for the United States (Louisiana Bar Foundation, 1993). From note 6 of Herman’s Detrimental Reliance article: “Professor J.L. Baudouin applied this term to the Civil Code as a whole. ‘A code is apparently complete in itself, but it is drafted in such a way that, in spite of its separation or division into books, chapters, and sections, there is a plasma that permeates it totally.’” [↩]
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Introduction,” in Democracy: The God That Failed. [↩]
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “How is Fiat Money Possible? or, The Devolution of Money and Credit,” and idem, with Jörg Guido Hülsmann and Walter Block, “Against Fiduciary Media,” both in The Economics and Ethics of Private Property. [↩]
See Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “Socialism: A Property or Knowledge Problem?”, in The Economics and Ethics of Private Property, p. 146: “Hayek’s contribution to the socialism debate must be thrown out as false, confusing, and irrelevant.”; see also Kinsella, “Knowledge vs. Calculation,” and Rothbard’s similar criticism, noted above. [↩]
Hans-Hermann Hoppe, “PFP101 | Hans-Hermann Hoppe, The Hayek Myth (PFS 2012),” Property and Freedom Podcast (April 12, 2022); idem, “Why Mises (and not Hayek)?”, Mises Daily (Oct. 4, 2011); idem, “F.A. Hayek on Government and Social Evolution: A Critique,” in The Great Fiction; see also Stephan Kinsella, “Hoppe on Hayek,” StephanKinsella.com (Sept. 20, 2009). [↩]
Tom Woods, “Interview with Hans Hoppe,” Tom Woods Elite Letter, Issue #18 (Summer 2025) and idem, “The Hans Hoppe Interview Concluded,” Tom Woods Elite Letter, Issue #19 (August 2025). [↩]
Kinsella, “Afterword,” p. 571. [↩]