Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 27:57 — 38.4MB)

Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 173.

This talk is from the 2017 Annual Meeting of the Property and Freedom Society.

Rahim Taghizadegan (Austria), Entrepreneurs: Heros, Crooks, and Visionaries.

PFS 2017 Playlist.

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Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 172.

This talk is from the 2017 Annual Meeting of the Property and Freedom Society.

Sean Gabb (England), X (England), Bruno Bandulet (Germany), Peter Wong (Lion Rock Institute) (Hong Kong), Discussion, Q&A.

PFS 2017 Playlist.

Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 33:36 — 46.2MB)

Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 171.

This talk is from the 2017 Annual Meeting of the Property and Freedom Society.

Peter Wong (Lion Rock Institute) (Hong Kong), The Return of the Middle Kingdom: Will It Be Stopped? Should It Be Stopped?

PFS 2017 Playlist.

Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 40:11 — 55.2MB)

Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 170.

This talk is from the 2017 Annual Meeting of the Property and Freedom Society.

Bruno Bandulet (Germany), The Looting of Germany: 1945–Present.

PFS 2017 Playlist.

Podcast: Play in new window | Download (Duration: 45:12 — 41.4MB)

Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 168.

This talk is from the 2017 Annual Meeting of the Property and Freedom Society. It contains introductory comments by Professor Hoppe including a remembrance of Ralph Raico, who had recently passed.¹ The main talk is: Sean Gabb (England), The Value of the Greek and Roman Classics.

PFS 2017 Playlist.

See the article version of this speech here.

1. See Ralph Raico, R.I.P. [↩]

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Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 167.

This panel discussion is from the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society. Walter Block (USA), Hans-Hermann Hoppe (Germany/Turkey), David Dürr (Switzerland), Doug Casey (USA), “Discussion—Q&A.”

PFS 2016 Playlist.

Podcast: Play in new window | Download (32.1MB)

Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 166.

This talk is from the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society. Doug Casey (USA), On Prospecting the World’s Regions.

PFS 2016 Playlist.

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Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 165.

This talk is from the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society. David Dürr (Switzerland), On How to Take the State to Court.

PFS 2016 Playlist.

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Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 164.

This is Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe‘s (Germany/Turkey) introduction before the afternoon sessions on Day 3 of the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society.

PFS 2016 Playlist.

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Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 163.

This talk is from the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society. Hans-Hermann Hoppe (Germany/Turkey), On the Ethics of Argumentation.

Transcript below.

PFS 2016 Playlist.

Related:

• Kinsella’s “Argumentation Ethics and Liberty: A Concise Guide,” Mises Daily (May 27, 2011).
• See youtube below:

[continue reading…]

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Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 162.

This talk is from the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society. Walter Block (USA), “Market Failure” – Fact or Fiction?

PFS 2016 Playlist.

Podcast: Play in new window | Download (2.3MB)

Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 161.

This is Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe‘s (Germany/Turkey) introduction before the morning sessions on Day 3 of the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society.

PFS 2016 Playlist.

Podcast: Play in new window | Download (57.1MB)

Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 160.

This panel discussion is from the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society. Heiner Rindermann (Germany), Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof (Germany), Anthony Daniels (Theodore Dalrymple) (England), Norman Stone† (UK/Turkey): “Discussion—Q&A”.

Related

• Lipton Matthews, The Forgotten Sin: America’s Treatment of Germans
• PFP156 | Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof, “On the Many Fathers of World War 2” (PFS 2016)
• Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof, “On the Many Fathers of World War 2”

PFS 2016 Playlist.

Podcast: Play in new window | Download (27.3MB)

Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 159.

This talk is from the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society. Norman Stone† (UK/Turkey), On Politics and Religion.

PFS 2016 Playlist.

Podcast: Play in new window | Download (25.8MB)

Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 158.

This talk is from the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society. Anthony Daniels (Theodore Dalrymple) (England), “On Bogus Illnesses and Their Enablers”.

PFS 2016 Playlist.

Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 157.

This is Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe‘s (Germany/Turkey) introduction before the afternoon sessions on Day 2 of the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society.

PFS 2016 Playlist.

Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 156.

This talk is from the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society. Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof (Germany), On the Many Fathers of World War II. Transcript and shownotes below.

See also:

• Lipton Matthews, The Forgotten Sin: America’s Treatment of Germans
• PFP160 | Rindermann, Daniels, Schultze-Rhonhof, Stone: “Discussion—Q&A” (PFS 2016)
• Gerd Schultze-Rhonhof, “On the Many Fathers of World War 2”

PFS 2016 Playlist.

Summary (Grok)

Lecture Overview 0:19

The speaker thanks the host and introduces his book 1939: The War That Had Many Fathers. As a young general staff officer he researched pre-World War II armament planning and discovered facts about preparations and intentions of American, British, Polish and French politicians to wage war against Germany.

Core Thesis on War Guilt 2:05

War guilt includes causing, triggering, and committing the war. Post-World War Two discussion focused only on Germany triggering the war. The causes from the prior 20 years by other nations are ignored in historiography and education. This makes Germany’s triggering appear as sole responsibility.

Versailles Principles and Ethnic Issues 4:46

International law after World War One emphasized inviolability of territories while using self-determination selectively. Vanquished nations lost more than foreign language areas. Nearly 15 million German speakers were handed to foreign states against their will, creating ethnic disorder and future conflict potential.

Warnings from Statesmen 7:38

Lloyd George, Marshal Foch, and William Bullitt warned that Versailles decisions would cause another war within 20 years.

British Role 9:29

Britain contributed by creating the Polish Corridor and Danzig issues to maintain conflict. Churchill and Hoover recognized the problems. Britain failed to resolve them and later gave Poland a guarantee that encouraged breaking off talks with Germany. Chamberlain used double dealing while Britain declared war on 3 September 1939.

French Actions 16:24

France undermined German security through disarmament violations, blocking negotiations, military incursions, and superior alliances. France torpedoed German-Polish Danzig talks and encouraged Poland toward war. France declared war on Germany knowing it could not save Poland.

Polish Policies 21:13

Poland received German territories including majority German areas. It repeatedly challenged Danzig’s Free State status and threatened war over customs issues. Poland closed rail routes in the Corridor threatening East Prussia’s economy and mistreated national minorities.

Soviet and American Involvement 27:43

The Soviet Union played an indirect role via the Hitler-Stalin Pact to recover territories from Poland. The United States intervened in World War One to protect loans, tolerated harsh Versailles terms, blocked mitigation efforts, and needled Britain and France toward war with Germany.

Overall Conclusion 34:08

All great powers share responsibility and should examine their roles self-critically. The speaker recommends his book for detailed sources.

Transcript (Grok)

Introduction 0:19

Ladies and gentlemen, at first I have to thank you, Officer Hopper, for your kind invitation to this splendid conference at this marvelous hotel. I’ve been invited to speak about my book 1939: The War That Had Many Fathers.

When I was a young general staff officer I had to develop a plan for future armored forces of the Bundeswehr beyond the 15 years time horizon. So I searched for examples of similar armament planning before World War II worldwide. To do that I had to read a lot of American, Czech, British and French literature of the pre-war period. What I found, to my surprise, were many pointers and hard facts about the preparations and intentions of American, British, Polish and French politicians of the 20s and 30s to wage war against Germany. I had never seen a reference of that in writings of German historians before. So I became curious, looked at the list of references which the authors quoted, went to the mentioned archives and found many interesting facts which were hitherto unknown in Germany. After I had retired I decided to write a book about it.

War Guilt 2:05

One can put blame on oneself by causing and adjusting, by triggering and instigating, and by committing. It is remarkable that since the end of World War Two it has only ever been discussed and described who has triggered the war, namely Germany. But that is only one part of the war guilt of World War Two. It has nearly never been examined and described who else has participated in causing the war and thus shares in the war guilt. You will for instance discover nothing about the conduct of Poland, France and Czechoslovakia towards Austria and Germany during the prior 20-year period.

The current and accepted historiography begins only ever when Germany commences to react and to resist. The causes of World War Two that had occurred within the 20 years before are not taught in high schools and universities and thereby they are extinguished from the collective memory of the world, even as far as teachers and historians are concerned. Hence only the partial guilt of triggering the war remains present in the collective memory.

Thus by consigning the other part of the guilt to obscurity, namely that of causing the war, our share in the war guilt becomes our sole responsibility for the origin of World War Two. By the way the same treatment applies to Japan regarding the war in the Pacific.

It is impossible for me to condense the 670 pages of my book into a 30-minute lecture. If you want to acquaint yourself with the sources, circumstantial evidence and proofs on which I have based myself I request you to turn to my book The War That Had Many Fathers. I therefore have to confine myself to stating the conclusions to which the archive material and the original documents have led me.

Conflicting Principles 4:46

Since the end of World War One international law knows two conflicting principles. There is the inviolability of territories and boundaries on the one side and the right of self-determination on the other. Until the end of World War One Great Britain, the USA, France and Russia had waged wars without restraint to acquire more territories. Having shared the booty of 1918 among themselves the colonial powers Great Britain, USA and France suddenly emphasized the inviolability of territories and boundaries and made it the predominant principle of international law.

The second idea that had been raised to a principle of international law was the right of self-determination. From the very first this right was mainly a lever to legitimize stripping the vanquished Germans, Austrians and Turks of their foreign language populations and territories. But the vanquished countries were deprived of much more than their foreign language territories and populations which by itself shows that this member of the vanquished was the favoring motive.

Thus twenty years before World War Two a new Europe was created in which 7.8 million German-speaking Germans and Austrians were handed over to foreign states without their consent and against their explicit wishes relying on the proclaimed right of self-determination. The constituent assembly in Vienna in its first session in November 1919 had decided to merge with the newly created Republic of Germany. This was specifically prohibited by the victors. So the right of self-determination was abrogated for another 7 million German-speaking citizens. Thus of World War One the right of self-determination had been repealed for nearly 15 million citizens of German language just as for 14 million citizens of other nations thereby creating an ethnic disorder which had high potential for future conflict.

Farsighted Comments 7:38

Some farsighted comments from the camp of the victors concerning the separation of millions of people from their home countries are interesting. For instance the British Prime Minister Lloyd George. He wrote: I can hardly envisage a stronger cause for future war. Or the French Marshal Foch who surely before had led the Allied ceasefire delegation at Compiègne. He said: This is not a peace. It is a ceasefire for 20 years.

All the American former Assistant Secretary of State William Bullitt who was also member of the US delegation in Versailles wrote: The unjust decisions of the Versailles Conference make new international conflict sure. Here one of the causes of World War Two is stated by the statesmen responsible. Most probably it wouldn’t have come to a new war after only 20 years if at the end of World War One the victorious nations had treated the German and Austrian citizens peacefully and had integrated them in a fair manner. One has to see some of the further causes of World War Two here. In particular the Czechs and the Poles are a case in point.

The Polish Corridor 9:29

I continue with a British contribution to the outbreak of the war. With the peace treaty of 1919 England made its first disastrous contribution towards the likelihood that the next war would follow soon. The British government in conjunction with the other victorious Allied powers constructed a new variant of its balance of power politics in Europe which was based on the intention of keeping a long term conflict among Germany, Czechoslovakia and Poland on the boil. Especially Danzig and the so-called Polish Corridor were someday to lead to new conflicts.

This was even recognized in England, France and in the United States of America. Here you see red framed the Free State of Danzig and blue framed the war gains of Poland. The small blue framed link from West Prussia in the center to the Baltic Sea in the North was the new connection from the Polish mainland to the Baltic Sea, the so-called Polish Corridor.

Churchill and Hoover 11:01

Churchill said on 24th November 1932 in a speech to the House of Commons: If the British government really wish to promote peace then it should take the initiative and reopen the issue of Danzig and the Corridor. If these matters are not resolved there can be no hope for a lasting peace.

The US President Hoover who was in office before Hitler’s time wrote in his memoirs that he and the French Prime Minister Laval agreed during the latter’s state visit in the United States that Danzig should be given back to Germany and that the Polish Corridor between East Prussia and Germany should be pruned back to the necessary minimum.

However England failed to eliminate the disruptive factors created in Versailles. Britain let the Danzig and the Corridor problem continue and left the element questions unresolved. Britain ignored the hardship of the minorities in Poland, in France and in Czechoslovakia. She took no notice of Austria’s desire for union with Germany and she tolerated France’s demand that Germany’s border should remain permanently unprotected in the west.

In the Sudeten crisis England for the first time endeavoured in earnest to repair some of the damage done in Versailles but with the annexation of the rest of Czechia Hitler then went too far. England used situations created to construct for Germany on the Danzig problem an obstacle at which the latter must stop or jump.

The British government offered the Polish government a guarantee against Germany although Germany had not yet even threatened Poland and although Poland and Germany were negotiating at the time. The German government was negotiating with the Polish government for the return of Danzig and the construction of an extraterritorial transport link between East Prussia and the German mainland through the Corridor. It offered in exchange the recognition of the Polish territorial gains of 1918 and the preservation of the Polish economic and port privileges in Danzig.

Poland had the opportunity to reach an agreed settlement with Germany but broke off negotiations after London’s guarantee of March 1939. It virtually removed any reason for Poland to respond positively to Berlin’s proposals. Poland changed its stance after that.

Chamberlain 14:37

Britain’s last and very direct contribution to the outbreak of the war was the double dealing with which the British government at the end strung along the German government. Thereby the British Prime Minister Chamberlain gave Hitler the impression he were interested in a German-British alliance which was untrue and that he wanted to play the fair broker between Poland and Germany. However at the same time Foreign Minister Halifax via the ambassador in Warsaw conveyed advice to the Polish government that one would only demand talks from the Poles but no concessions. Even in arranging the venue and the date of such negotiations the British initially left the Germans in the false belief that they had amended the German conditions for the talks to the Poles. So at five minutes before twelve they played for time until Hitler acted and opened the war.

The British government managed cleverly to feign the role of mediator and seemingly to pursue the cause of peace. Thus it could enter into the war with a clean slate. On 3rd September 1939 Great Britain declared war on Germany wherein knowing that she wouldn’t have the slightest chance to support Poland.

France Contribution to the Outbreak of the War 16:24

After the peace treaty of Versailles France concluded no real peace with its neighbor Germany. Along with the other victors it created the already mentioned hotspots which made the next war almost inevitable. France tried in four ways to undermine German sovereignty and its external security. Firstly the French in breach of their disarmament obligations under the Versailles Treaty did not comply with their obligations. Secondly the French government from 1927 to 1933 successfully blocked the Geneva disarmament negotiations and so prevented Germany from becoming again capable of self-defense. Thirdly France took advantage of Germany’s weakness and on two occasions had its troops march into Germany in breach of the sense of the peace treaty. And fourthly France within a few years walled in Germany with a number of military treaties. France succeeded in putting together an alliance whose strength was superior to Germany’s 12-fold in peacetime and roughly 9.5 times including their reserves.

So Hitler and the Reich armed forces had to orient themselves to this level when determining the level of buildup of the new army in 1935. Even before Hitler had occupied the remainder of the Czech Republic in March 1939 and thus before he had delivered a casus belli to France the French government intervened from Paris in the Polish-German negotiations about Danzig and torpedoed them. At that time Hitler’s modest proposal was still valid and that proposal reads: Danzig politically comes to Germany but economically remains with Poland.

On the 26th January of 1939 thus before the Czech occupation the French Prime Minister Daladier and his Foreign Minister Bonnet advised the Warsaw government to reject the requests of certain neighbors with a categorical no. Yet Paris knew Hitler well enough to know that he wouldn’t let the Danzig issue remain unsolved. Thus the advice of the categorical no for the German requests meant nothing other than deliberately to opt for war. This does not only allow the suspicion but permits the conclusion that the French government as early as January 1939 had attempted to bait Poland into a war to serve French interests.

In May 1939 the French commander-in-chief General Gamelin promised the Polish War Minister Kasprzycki that France together with Poland would enter into a campaign against Germany. The French Prime Minister Daladier knew that Gamelin did not intend to honor this promise. If and when the need arose he left the Poles in the false belief that they together with France could be victorious against Germany. France hoped with the minimal effort on its own part to defeat Germany with the joint forces of an allied alliance. On 3rd September 1939 France declared war on Germany in the full knowledge that it wouldn’t save Poland.

Poland’s Contribution 21:13

After World War One the victorious powers had allocated several former German territories to Poland: the province of West Prussia with a nearly 35 percent Polish but majoritarian German population and the province of Posen and the most of Upper Silesia with Polish majority. The city of Danzig with a 97% German population had become a so-called Free State under the suzerainty of the League of Nations thus a small Republic. According to the Treaty of Versailles particular customs rights, postal, railway, traffic and other rights and authorities were vested to the state of Poland together with the external representation of the Free State. However Poland did not acknowledge the other sovereign rights that remained with the Free State. It demanded that they be transferred to Poland.

Poland applied to the League of Nations to be declared Protectorate power for Danzig and to gain ultimate suzerainty over Danzig. It tried to garrison troops in Danzig and to establish its own postal network there. It attempted to exchange the passports of the people into Polish passports. It placed 24 Polish governmental officers in the city and it transferred warships into the port of Danzig. Even before Hitler came to power the League of Nations had to intervene on 106 occasions in clashes between the Free State of Danzig and the Republic of Poland. The League of Nations rejected almost all of the Polish claims.

In summer 1939 the disputes between Poland and Danzig culminated in a conflict about arming of Polish customs officials on Danzig territory. The Danzig Senate which means the Danzig government refused to accept the arming and terminated the cooperation of the Danzig and the Polish customs services. The Polish government thereupon threatened war to the Free State. It was Hitler who three weeks before the actual outbreak of the war urged the president of the Senate of Danzig to give way. He said he didn’t want a dispute with Poland. He wished to keep the door open for further negotiations. If it was anybody who brought the Danzig issue to the boil it was the state of Poland with its Danzig policy up to 1939.

Corridor Problem 24:47

In 1921 Germany had to cede West Prussia to Poland therewith the territory between East Prussia and the German mainland. This part of West Prussia was called the Polish Corridor. Across West Prussia ran eight former German railway routes. Two-thirds of the transport running across these routes were carrying coal from German mines to the energy supply of East Prussia. The transit fees for it had to be paid to Poland in zloty. This had been contractually agreed. However after the world economic crisis Germany did not have enough income in zloty to cover the fees in full. From then on Germany paid the offsetting amount of zloty in Reichsmark instead and wished to offset the balance against Polish debts. Poland rejected both. As a penalty Poland closed one rail route between Germany and East Prussia after the other and in 1936 it even threatened to block the Corridor completely thereby East Prussia would have been exposed to economic ruin something the Soviet Union had attempted 20 years later with the Berlin blockade in a similar fashion. This led to the second aim for negotiations with or if necessary the war against Poland namely to gain an extraterritorial rail link between Germany and East Prussia under German sovereignty and management and at its expense.

I’m sure I need not dwell on the third reason for negotiations or for war. It is well known how Poland dealt with its 11.9 million people of national minorities the Belarusians, the Ukrainians, the Jews and the Germans in their country. Hitler demanded that Poland should respect minority rights of the Germans in Poland according to the guarantee in the Versailles Treaty and again in a later treaty concluded 1937.

The Soviet Union 27:43

I should not omit that the Polish government in 1933 three times proposed the French government to open a two-front war against a still disarmed Germany what France refused. I believe that Poland had a great share of the responsibility for the outbreak of the war with its endless quarrels about Danzig and its threat to cut off East Prussia from its energy supply.

The Soviet Union has only an indirect share in the outbreak of World War Two. Until shortly before the outbreak of war it negotiated for an alliance with England and France to go to war against Germany. When the Soviets knew that Great Britain didn’t intend to participate in such a war with more than a minimum of its own forces they changed sides. On the invitation of Stalin the Hitler-Stalin Pact was concluded that was to give Hitler cover for his negotiations with or its campaign against Poland. Moscow’s primary interest at that time was to recover the parts of former Russia and Ukraine which Poland had conquered in 1921 today misleadingly known as East Poland. In this illegally acquired eastern Poland lived only a 16 percent share of Polish inhabitants. Thus the complicity of the Soviet Union in the outbreak of World War Two is relatively limited.

The Contribution of the United States of America 29:56

This contribution shouldn’t be omitted here. When in World War One the risk of the defeat of the Russian Empire was imminent and thereby a victory of Germany not improbable anymore the USA intervened in the European war in support of Great Britain and France. The USA didn’t want to lose their enormous war loans to both countries should they be defeated. The war loans to the Western Allies added together to the two-fold of the National annual budget of the USA at that time. England, France and Germany were worn out and ripe for a compromise peace on equal terms but that didn’t occur.

What followed instead was the German defeat, the disaster of Versailles, the separation of nearly 30 million European citizens from their home countries, the destabilization of Germany, the Third Reich, Hitler and the Second World War.

Towards the end of World War One U.S. President Wilson promised Germany and the Habsburg Empire a peace of reconciliation with his famous 14 points offer prior to ceasefire. These 14 points moreover had been mutually confirmed as binding for both sides by five note exchanges between Germany and the USA. But then the victors did not keep their word. The USA in Versailles tolerated the harsh conditions that had been imposed on Germany without negotiations. Twenty years later these conditions caused the Second World War. That is to say Danzig, West Prussia, the Corridor, the Memel conflict, the Sudetenland, the minority problems, the sham disarmament conferences and so on. All that hadn’t occurred without the unjustified intervention of the USA into World War One.

Conclusion 32:42

From 1933 onwards the United States attempted to block any mitigation of the Versailles provisions. President Roosevelt insisted on the status quo for the vanquished Germany. From 33 on the United States reinforced their Navy and in 34 the first instruction was issued to develop war plans against Germany, Austria and Hungary which were designed in 1935 and 36 at the Army War College as the so called Rainbow Plans.

Interestingly the US ambassador to London Joseph Kennedy in December 1945 looked back to his time in London and said neither the French nor the British would have made Poland a cause of war if it hadn’t been for the constant needling from Washington. The United States of America apparently were the warmongers in the background.

Now it should be the turn of the German contribution to the outbreak of World War II but this is so well known that I need not give a lecture on it. My conclusion: When it is about the blame for World War Two all great powers should look self-critically into the mirror.

Please let me add if your curiosity for the subject has been stimulated you can turn to the book The War That Had Many Fathers for details and reference on documentary sources. Unfortunately no English-speaking publisher has issued the English-language translation of the book. One can only read any at Amazon as a print-on-demand copy. I would be glad to find still a publisher. Thank you for your patient attention.

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Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 155.

This talk is from the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society. Heiner Rindermann (Germany), “Cognitive and Cultural ‘Enrichment’ of Europe by Immigration”.

PFS 2016 Playlist.

Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 154.

This is Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe‘s (Germany/Turkey) introduction before the morning sessions on Day 2 of the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society.

PFS 2016 Playlist.

Podcast: Play in new window | Download (42.1MB)

Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 153.

This panel discussion is from the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society. Olivier Richard (Switzerland), Rahim Taghizadegan (Austria), X (England), Sean Gabb (England), Daniel Model (Liechtenstein; Model Holding), “Discussion—Q&A.”

PFS 2016 Playlist.

Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 152.

This talk is from the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society. Daniel Model (Liechtenstein; Model Holding), On the Hardship of Doing Business (in Switzerland).

PFS 2016 Playlist.

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Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 151.

This talk is from the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society. Sean Gabb (England), “Margaret Thatcher—Hero or Villain?”

PFS 2016 Playlist.

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Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 149.

This is Professor Hans-Hermann Hoppe‘s (Germany/Turkey) introduction before the afternoon talks on Day 1 of the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society.

PFS 2016 Playlist.

Podcast: Play in new window | Download (24.2MB)

Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 147.

This talk is from the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society. Rahim Taghizadegan (Austria), On the Rise and Fall of the University.

PFS 2016 Playlist.

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Property and Freedom Podcast, Episode 147.

This talk is from the 2016 meeting of the Property and Freedom Society. Olivier Richard (Switzerland), On Free and Compulsory Education.

PFS 2016 Playlist.